Kelly v. Robinson by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
~'· ~ v J-q 




KELLY v, ROBINSON 3 
in bankruptcy had not altered the conditions of Robinson's 
probation. The court adopted the analysis it had applied in a 
similar case decided one month earlier, In re Pellegrino 
(Pellegrino v. Division of Criminal Justice), 42 B. R. 129 
(Bkrtc Ct. Conn. 1984 . 
In Pellegrino, t e court began with the Bankruptcy Code's 
definitional sections. First, § 101(11) defines a "debt" as a 
"liability on a claim." In turn, § 101(4) defines a "claim" as a 
"right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to 
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, ma-
tured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, se-
cured, or unsecured." Finally, § 101(9) defines a "creditor" 
as an "entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at 
the time of or before the order for relief concerning the 
debtor." 
The Bankruptcy Court then examined the statute under 
which the Connecticut judge had sentenced the debtor to pay 
restitution. Restitution appears as one of the conditions of 
probation enumerated in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30. Under 
that section, restitution payments are sent to the Probation 
Office. The payment\ then "are forwarded to the victim. 
Although the Connecticut penal code does not provide for en-
forcement of the probation conditions by the victim, it does 
authorize the trial court to issue a warrant for the arrest of a 
criminal defendant who has violated a condition of probation. 
§53a-32. 
Because the Connecticut statute does not allow the victim 
to enforce a right to receive payment, the court concluded 
that neither the victim nor the Probation Office had a "right 
to payment, and hence neither was owed a "debt" under the 
Bankruptcy Code. It ar e :) 
~~nlike an obligation which arises out of a contractual, 
statutory or common law duty, here the obligation is 
rooted in the traditional responsibility of a state to pro-
tect its citizens by enforcing its criminal statutes and to 
4 
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rehabilitate an offender by imposing a criminal sanction 
intended for that purpose. 42 B. R., at 133. 
The court acknowledged the tension between its conclusion 
and the Code's expansive definition of debt, but found an ex-
ception to the statutory definition in "the long-standing tradi-
tion of restraint by federal courts from interference with tra-
ditional functions of state governments." I d., at 13,Y 
~ 1f <- The court concluded that, even if the 1M'>bation condition 
was a debt subject to bankruptcy jurisdiction, it was non-
dischargeable under § 523(a)(7) of the Code. That subsection 
provides that a discharge in bankruptcy does not affect any 
debt that "is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and 
for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensa-
t'on for actual pecuniary loss." 
The court.,t.coJ:u:la~ that the purpose of the restitution 
~ ondition was "to pr mote the rehabilitation of the offender, 
not to compensate the victim." 42 B. R., at 137. It specifi-
cally rejected the argument that the restitution must be 
deemed compensatory because the amount precisely matched 
the victim's loss. It noted that the state statute allows an 
offender "to make restitution of the fruits of his offense or 
make restitution, in an amount he can afford to pay or pro-
vide in a suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused 
thereby," Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30(a)(4). In its view, the 
Connecticut statute focuses "upon the offender and not on the 
victim, and . . . restitution is part of the criminal penalty 
rather than compensation for a victim's actual loss." 42 
B. R., at 137. Thus, the Bankruptcy Court held that the 
bankruptcy discharge had not affected the conditions of 
Pellegrino's probation. The United States District Court for 
the District of Connecticut adopted the Bankruptcy Court's 
proposed dispositions of Pellegrino and this case without 
alteration. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. It 
first examined the Code's definition of debt. Although it 
recognized that most courts had reached the opposite conclu-
I 
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sion, the court. decided that a restitution obligation imposed 
as a condition of probation is a debt. It relied on the legisla-
tive history of the Coda that evinced Congress's intent to 
broaden the definition of "debt" from the much narrower def-
inition of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The court also noted 
that anomalies might result from a conclusion that such an 
obligation is not a debt. Most importantly, nondebt status 
would deprive a state of the opportunity to participate in dis-
tribution of the bankrupt's estate. 
Having concluded that restitution obligations are debts, 
the court turned to the question of dischargeability. The 
court stated that the appropriate Connecticut agency proba-
bly could have avoided discharge of the debt if it had objected 
under §§ 523(a)(2) or 523(a)(4) of the Code. 3 As no objec-
tions to discharge were filed, the court concluded that the 
State could rely only on § 523(a)(7), the subsection that pro-
vides for automatic nondischargeability for certain debts. 4 
The court then looked to the text of the Connecticut statute 
to determine whether Robinson's probation condition was 
"compensation for actual pecuniary loss" within the meaning 
of § 523(a)(7). But where the Bankruptcy Court had consid-
3 Section 523(a)(2)(A) protects from discharge debts "for obtaining 
money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinance of credit, 
by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud." · Section 
523(a)(4) protects from discharge debts "for fraud or defalcation while act-
ing in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny." Under § 523(c), 
debts that are protected from discharge only by § 523(a)(2) or § 523(a)(4) 
are discharged unless the creditor files an objection to discharge during the 
bankruptcy proceedings. Because Robinson was convicted of larceny, one 
of the debts listed in§ 523(a)(4), it is quite likely that the Bankruptcy Court 
would have found the debt nondischargeable under that subsection. 
'The requirement that creditors object to discharge is limited on its 
face to paragraphs (2), (4), and (6) of§ 523(a). Because paragraph 7 is not 
listed there, debts described in that paragraph are automatically non-
dischargeable, under the general rule prescribed in the opening clause of 
§ 523(a) (providing that a "discharge under section 727 ... of this title does 
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ered the entire state probation system, the Court of Appeals 
focused only on the language that allows a restitution order 
to be assessed "for the loss or damage caused [by the crime]," 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30(a)(4). The court thought this lan-
guage compelled the conclusion that the probation condition 
was "compensation for actual pecuniary loss." It held, 
therefore, that this particular condition of Robinson's proba-
tion was not protected from discharge by § 523(a)(7). Ac-
cordingly, it reversed the District Court. 
We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari. 
We have jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1). We reverse. 
II 
The Court of Appeals' decision focused primarily on the 
language of §§ 101 and 523 of the Code. Of course, the 
"starting point in every case involving construction of a stat-
ute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring). But the text is only the starting point. As JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR explained last Term, "'"In expounding a statute, 
we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a 
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to 
its object and policy.""' Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallen-
tire, 477 U. S. --, -- (1986) (quoting Mastro Plastics 
Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 350 U. S. 270, 285 
(1956) (quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 8 How. 
113, 122 (1849))). In this case, we must consider the lan-
guage of§§ 101 and 523 in light of the history of bankruptcy 
court deference to criminal judgments and in light of the in-
terests of the States in unfettered administration of their 
criminal justice systems. 
A 
Courts traditionally have been reluctant to interpret fed-
eral bankruptcy statutes to remit state criminal judgments" 
The present text of Title 11, commonly referred to as the 
/r1 tf}-tdd-
~#. I I 
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Bankruptcy Code, was enacted in 1978 to replace the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.0 The treatment of 
criminal judgments under the Act of 1898 informs our under-
standing of the language of the Code. 
First, § 57 of the Act established the category of "allowa-
ble" debts. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ~57 (14th ed. 1977). 
Only if a debt was allowable could the creditor receive a share 
of the bankrupt's assets. See § 65a. For this case, it is im-
portant to note that § 57j excluded from the class of allowable 
debts penalties owed to government entities. That section 
provided: 
Debts owing to the United States, a State, a county, a 
district, or a municipality as a penalty or forfeiture shall 
not be allowed, except for the amount of the pecuniary 
loss sustained by the act, transaction, or proceeding out 
of which the penalty or forfeiture arose. 30 Stat., at 
561. 
Second, § 63 established the separate category of "prov-
able" debts. See 3A Collier on Bankruptcy ~ 63 (14th ed. 
1975). Section 17 provided that a discharge in bankruptcy 
"release[d] a bankrupt from all of his provable debts," subject 
to several exceptions listed in later portions of § 17. Al-
though § 17 specifically excepted four types of debts from dis-
charge, it did not mention criminal penalties of any kind. 
The most natural construction of the Act therefore would 
have allowed criminal penalties to be discharged in bank-
ruptcy, even though the government was not entitled to a 
share of the bankrupt's estate. Congress had considered 
criminal penalties when it passed the Act; it clearly made 
them nonallowable. The failure expressly to make them 
6 Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act several times between 1898 
and 1978. Congress also made numerous technical changes to the Code in 
the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 380. None of those changes is relevant to this 
decision. 
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nondischargeable at the same time offered substantial sup-
port for the view that the Act discharged those penalties. 
But the courts did not interpret the Act in this way. De-
spite the clear statutory language, most courts refused to 
allow a discharge in bankruptcy to affect the judgment of a 
state criminal court. In the leading case, the court 
reasoned: 
It might be admitted that sections 63 and 17 of the bank-
rupt act, if only the letter of those provisions be looked 
to, would embrace [criminal penalties]; but it is well set-
tled that there may be cases in which such literal con-
struction is not admissible. . . . It may suffice to say that 
nothing but a ruling from a higher court would convince 
me that congress, by any provision of the bankrupt act, 
intended to permit the discharge, under its operations, 
of any judgment entered by a state or federal court im-
posing a fine in the enforcement of criminal laws. . .. 
The provisions of the bankrupt act have reference alone 
to civil liabilities, as demands between debtor ·and credi-
tors, as such, and not to punishment inflicted pro bono 
publico for crimes committed." In re Moore, 111 F. 145, 
148-149 (WD Ky. 1901). 6 
This reasoning w~ accepted by the time Con-
gress enacted the new Code that a leading commentator 
could state flatly that "fines and penalties are not affected by 
• Although courts differed as to the boundaries of the exception, particu-
larly in cases involving nonmonetary sanctions, or sanctions imposed in 
civil proceedings, the reasoning of Moore was widely accepted. See, e. g., 
Parker v. United States, 153 F . 2d 66, n· (CAl 1946) (citing Moore and 
noting that "[i]t was not in the contemplation of Congress that the federal 
bankruptcy power should be employed to pardon a bankrupt from the con-
sequences of a criminal offense"); Zwick v. Freeman, 373 F. 2d 110, 116 
(CA2 1967) (citing Moore and stating that "governmental sanctions are not 
regarded as debts even when they require monetary payments"). We 
have found only one federal court decision allowing a discharge in bank-
ruptcy to affect a sentence imposed by a. criminal court. In re Alderson, 
98 F. 588 (W. Va. 1899). 
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a discharge." See lA Collier on Bankruptcy ~ 17 .13, at 
1609-1610, and n. 10 (14th ed. 1979). 
Moreover, those few courts faced with restitution obliga-
tions imposed as part of criminal sentences applied the same 
reasoning to prevent a discharge in bankruptcy from affect-
ing such a condition of a criminal sentence. For instance, 
four years before Congress enacted the Code, the New York 
Supreme Court stated: 
A discharge in bankruptcy has no effect whatsoever 
upon a condition of restitution of a criminal sentence. A 
bankruptcy proceeding is civil in nature and is intended 
to relieve an honest and unfortunate debtor of his debts 
and to permit him to begin his financial life anew. A 
condition of restitution in a sentence of probation is a 
part of the judgment of conviction. It does not create a 
debt nor a debtor/creditor relationship between the per-
sons making and receiving restitution. As with any 
other condition of a probationary sentence it is intended 
as a means to insure the defendant will lead a law-abid-
ing life thereafter. State v. Mosesson, 78 Misc. 2d 217, 
218, 356 N. Y. S. 2d 483, 484 (1974) (citations omitted). 7 
\1:::;- Thus, Congress enacted the Code in 1978 against the back-
ground of an established judicial exception to discharge for 
criminal sentences, including restitution orders, an exception 
· created in the face of a statute drafted with considerable care 
and specificity. 
Just last Term we declined to hold that the new Bank-
ruptcy Code silently abrogated exceptions created by courts 
construing the old Act. In Midlantic National Bank v. New 
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 474 U. S. 
-- (1986), a trustee in bankruptcy asked us to hold that the 
1978 Code had implicitly repealed an exception to the trust-
7 For other decisions adopting this reasoning, see State ex rel. Auerbach 
v. Topping Bros., 79 Misc. 2d 260, 359 N. Y. S. 2d 985, 987-988 (Crim. Ct. 
1974); State v. Washburn , 97 Cal. App. 3d 621, 625-626, 158 Cal. Rptr. 
822, 825 (1979). 
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ee's abandonment power. Courts had reated that exception 
out of deference to state health and safety ~~ions, a con-
sideration comparable to the States' interests im~ated by----
this case. We stated: 
The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Con-
gress intends for legislation to change the interpretation 
of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent spe-
cific. The Court has followed this rule with particular 
care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. 
If Congress wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary 
exemption from non-bankruptcy law, "the intention 
would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or 
inferred from disputable considerations of convenience in 
administering the estate of the bankrupt." 4 7 4 U. S., at 
-- (quoting Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444 
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As JUSTICE BRENNAN has noted, federal adjudication of mat-
ters already at issue in state criminal proceedings can be "an 
unwarranted and unseemly duplication of the State's own ad-
judicative process." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 121 
(1971) (opinion of BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). 9 
1\~ as Robinson's attorney conceded at oral argument, 
some restitution orders would not be protected from dis-
charge even if the state did appear and enter an objection to 
discharge. For example, a criminal judge in a negligent 
homicide case might sentence the defendant to probation, 
conditioned on the defendant's paying the victim's husband 
compensation for the loss the husband sustained when the 
defendant killed his wife. It is not clear that such a res-
titution order would fit the terms of any of the exceptions to 
discharge listed in§ 523 other than§ 523(a)(7). Thus, this in-
terpretation of the Code would do more than force state pros-
~---f--:-.j£)~----...:e::c::.u1~o~r~s:;£q;:::o defend state criminal 'ud ents in federal bank-
., .- (/ ~ ruptcy court. I · lea o e era rem1Ss1o 
~; of judgments imposed by state criminal judges. .-'--
tl"''- ,, • • · b ) This prospect, in turn, would hamper the flexibility of state f 
~~ criminal judges in choosing the combination of imprisonment, _..--:::::-.:--._ 
 "' fines, and restitution most likely to further rehabilitation of , 
J the defendant. Restitution is a particularly effective means 
for rehabilitation because it forces the defendant to confront, 
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in concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused. Trial 
judges often prefer such an order to a fine, paid to the State ~ 
as an abstract and impersonal entity, and often calculated 
without regard to the harm the defendant has caused. The 
direct relation between the harm and the punishment may 
make restitution a valuable deterrent as well. 10 
Robinson attempts to minimize this difficulty by arguing 
that state prosecutors and criminal judges need only consult 
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code before selecting the 
appropriate sentence./\ This contention misses the point en- ._\ 
tirely. We are not troubled by requirements that state offi- ) ? 
cials understand and apply federal law. But we will not f 
lightly limit the rehabilitative and deterrent options available 1 
to state criminal judges. In cases raising close questions of ~ 
dischargeability under the Bankruptcy Code, those judges f 
{ would be put to a harsh choice: impose the sentence that best \ 
suits the interests of the state criminal process, and hope that 
I the federal courts will not disturb that judgment; or forgo 
. ) imposition of a restitution order to ensure continued enforce- ~ 
ment of some criminal judgment. In short, the Court of Ap-
peals' interpretation of the Code would entail substantial in- ..J 
'--terference in the state criminal process. -
In one of our cases interpreting the Act, Justice Douglas 
remarked: "[W]e do not read these statutory words with the 
ease of a computer. There is an overriding consideration 
that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy 
jurisdiction." Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U. S. 99, 103 
(1966). This Court has recognized that the States' interest 
in administering their criminal justice systems free from fed-
eral interference is one of the most powerful of the consider-
ations that should influence a court considering equitable 
types of relief. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 44-45 
10 See Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural 
Analysis, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 931, 937- 941 (1984). 
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(1971). This reflection of our federalism also must influence 
our interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code in this case. 11 
III 
In light of the long pre-Code jkaditi9ll precladi:Rg ba~ '"\ 
reptcy-e'otH"ts frosm altePifl.g criminal judgments, we have se-
rious doubts whether Congress intended to make criminal 
penalties "debts" within the meaning of § 101(4). 12 But we 
need not address that question in this case, because we hold 
that § 523(a)(7) preserves from discharge any condition a 
state criminal court imposes as part of a criminal sentence. 
The relevant portion of § 523(a)(7) protects from discharge 
any debt 
to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture 
payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, 
and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss. 
This language is subject to interpretation. On its face, 
§ 523(a)(7) certainly does not compel the conclusion reached 
"Justice Frankfurter advocated a similar approach to the interpretation 
of regulatory statutes that infringe upon important state interests: 
The task is one of accommodation as between assertions of new federal au-
thority and historic functions of the individual states. Federal legislation 
of this character cannot therefore be construed without regard to the impli-
cations of our dual system of government . ... The underlying assumptions 
of our dual form of government, and the consequent presuppositions of leg-
islative draftsmanship which are expressive of our history and habits, cut 
across what might otherwise be the implied range of legislation. The his-
tory of congressional legislation ... justif[ies] the generalization that, 
when the Federal Government takes over such local radiations in the vast 
network of our national economic enterprise and thereby radically read-
justs the balance of state and national authority, those charged with the 
duty of legislating are reasonably explicit. Frankfurter, Some Reflections 
on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Col. L. Rev. 527, 539-540 (1947). 
'
2 We recognize, as the Court of Appeals emphasized, that the Code's 
definition of "debt" is broadly drafted, and that the legislative history sup-
ports a broad reading of the definition. But nothing in the legislative his-
tory of these sections suggests that Congress intended to change the state 
of the law with respect to criminal judgments. 
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by the Court of Appeals, that a discharge in bankruptcy voids 
restitution orders imposed as conditions of probation by state 
courts. Nowhere in the House and Senate Reports, is there 
any indication that this language should be read so intru-
sively.'3 If Congress had intended, by § 523(a)(7) or by any 
other provision, to discharge state criminal sentences, "we 
can be certain that there would have been hearings, testi-
mony, and debate concerning consequences so wasteful, so 
inimical to purposes previously deemed important, and so 
likely to arouse public outrage," Tennessee Valley Authority 
v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 209 (1978) (POWELL, J., dissenting). 
Our reading of § 523(a)(7) differs from that of the Second 
Circuit. On its face, it creates a broad exception for all penal 
sanctions, whether they be denominated fines, penalties, or 
forfeitures. Congress included two qualifying phrases; the 
13 For the section-by-section analysis in the legislative reports, see H. R. 
Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. , 363 (1977); S. Rep. No. 989, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. , 79 (1978). For explanations of the section by commen-
tators , see 3 Collier on Bankruptcy H23.17 (15th ed. 1986); 1 Norton 
Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 27.37 (1981). In fact, both of these com-
mentators expressly state that the language should not have the intrusive 
effect sought by Robinson. See Collier,~ 523.17, at 523-123 n. 4; Norton, 
§ 27.37, at 55 n. 2. 
It seems likely that the limitation of § 523(a)(7) to fines assessed "for the 
benefit of a federal, state, or local government" was intended to prevent 
application of that subsection to wholly private penalties such as punitive 
damages. See House Doc. No. 137, pt. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 116, 141 
(1973). As for the reference to "compensation for actual pecuniary loss," 
the Senate Report indicates that the main purpose of this language was to 
prevent § 523(a)(7) from being applied to tax penalties. S. Rep. No. 989, 
95th Cong. , 2d Sess. , 79 (1978). 
We acknowledge that a few stray comments in the hearings and the 
Bankruptcy Laws Commission Report may suggest that the language 
bears the interpretation adopted by the Second Circuit. But none of those 
statements was made by a member of Congress, nor were they included in 
the official Senate and House reports. We decline to accord any signifi-
cance to these statements. See McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 
U. S. 488, 493-494 (1931); 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Con-
struction § 48.10, at 319, and n. 11 (rev. 4th ed. 1984). 
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fines must be both "to and for the benefit of a governmental 
unit," and "not compensation for pecuniary loss." Section 
523(a)(7) protects traditional criminal fines; it codifies the ju-
dicially created exception to discharge for fines. We must 
decide whether the result is altered by the two major differ-
ences between restitution and a traditional fine. Unlike tra-
ditional fines, restitution~forwarded to the victim, and may 
be calculated by reference to the amount of harm the offender 
has caused. 
In our view, neither of the qualifying clauses of§ 523(a)(7) 
allows the discharge of a criminal judgment that takes the 
form of restitution. The criminal justice system is not oper-
ated primarily for the benefit of victims, but for the benefit of 
society as a whole. Thus, it is concerned not only with pun-
ishing the offender, but also with rehabilitating him. Al-
though restitution does resemble a judgment "fpr the benefit 
of" the victim, the context in which it is imposed undermines 
that conclusion. The victim has no control over the amount 
of restitution awarded or over the decision to award restitu-
tion. Moreover, the decision to impose restitution generally 
does not turn on the victim's injury, but on the penal goals of 
the State and the situation of the defendant. • 
This point is well illustrated by the Connecticut statute 
under which the restitution obligation was imposed. The 
statute authorizes a judge to impose any of eight specified 
conditions of probation, as well as "any other conditions 
reasonably related to his rehabilitation." Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§ 53a-30(a)(9). Clause (4) of that section authorizes a judge 
to require that the defendant 
make restitution of the fruits of his offense or make res-
titution, in an amount he can afford to pay or provide in a 
suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused thereby 
and the court may fix the amount thereof and the man-
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This clause does not require imposition of restitution in the 
amount of the harm caused. Instead, it provides for a flexi-
ble remedy tailored to the defendant's situation. 
Because criminal proceedings focus on the State's interests 
in rehabilitation and punishment, rather than the victim's de-
sire for compensation, we conclude that restitution orders im-
posed in such proceedings operate A_'for the benefit of" the 
State. Similarly, they are not assessed "for ... compensa-
tion" of the victim. The sentence following a criminal con-
viction necessarily considers the penal and rehabilitative in-
terests of the state. 14 Those interests are sufficient to place 
restitution orders within the meaning of § 523(a)(7). 
In light of the strong interests of the States, the uniform 
construction of the old Act over three-quarters of a century, 
and the absence of any significant evidence that Congress in-
tended to change the law in this area, we believe this result 
best effectuates the will of Congress. Accordingly, the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is 
Reversed. 
''This is not the only context in which courts have been forced to evalu-
ate the treatment of restitution orders by determining whether they were 
"compensatory" or "penal." Several lower courts have addressed the con-
stitutionality of the federal Victim Witness Protection Act, 18 U. S. C. 
§ 3579. Under that Act, defendants have no right to jury trial as to the 
amount of restitution, even though the Seventh Amendment would require 
such a trial if the issue were decided in a civil case. See Note, The Right 
to a Jury Trial to Determine Restitution Under the Victim and Witness 
Protection Act of 1982, 63 Texas L. Rev. 671 (1984). Every federal circuit 
court that has considered the question has concluded that criminal de-
fendants contesting the assessment of restitution orders are not entitled to 
the protections of the Seventh Amendment. See id., at 672 n. 18 (citing 
cases). 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1033 
JOHN J. KELLY, CONNECTICUT CHIEF STATE'S 
ATTORNEY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
CAROLYN ROBINSON 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[October -, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We granted review in this case to decide whether restitu-
tion obligations, imposed as conditions of probation in state 
criminal proceedings, are dischargeable in proceedings under 
Chapter 7 of the ·Bankruptcy Code. 
I 
In 1980, Carolyn Robinson pled guilty to larceny in the sec-
ond degree. The charge was based on her wrongful receipt 
of $9,932.95 in welfare benefits from the Connecticut Depart-
ment of Income Maintenance. On November 14, 1980, the 
Connecticut Superior Court sentenced Robinson to a prison 
term of not less than one year nor more than three years. 
The court suspended execution of the sentence and placed 
Robinson on probation for five years. As a condition of pro-
bation, the judge ordered Robinson to make restitution 1 to 
the State of Connecticut Office of Adult Probation (Probation 
1 Connecticut Gen. Stat. § 53a-30 sets out the conditions a trial court 
may impose on a sentence of probation. Clause 4 of that section authorizes 
a condition that the defendant "make restitution of the fruits of his offense 
or make restitution, in an amount he can afford to pay or provide in a suit-
able manner, for the loss or damage caused thereby and the court may fix 
the amount thereof and the manner of performance." 
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Office) at the rate of $100 per month, commencing January 
16, 1981, and continuing until the end of her probation. 2 
On February 5, 1981, Robinson filed a voluntary petition 
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 701 et 
seq., in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District 
of Connecticut. That petition listed the restitution obliga-
tion as a debt. On February 20, 1981, the Bankruptcy Court 
notified both of the Connecticut agencies of Robinson's peti-
tion and informed them that April27, 1981, was the deadline 
for filing objections to discharge. The agencies did not file 
proofs of claim or objections to discharge, apparently because 
they took the position that the bankruptcy would not affect 
the conditions of Robinson's probation. Thus, the agencies 
did not participate in the distribution of Robinson's estate. 
On May 14, 1981, the bankruptcy court granted Robinson a 
discharge. See § 727. 
At the time Robinson received her discharge in bank-
ruptcy, she had paid $450 in restitution. On May 20, 1981, 
her attorney wrote the Probation Office that he believed the 
discharge had altered the conditions of Robinson's probation, 
voiding the condition that she pay restitution. Robinson 
made no further payments. 
The Connecticut Probation Office did not respond to this 
letter until February 1984, when it informed Robinson that it 
considered the obligation to pay restitution nondischarge-
able. Robinson responded by filing an adversary proceeding 
in the Bankruptcy Court, seeking a declaration that the res-
titution obligation had been discharged, as well as an injunc-
tion tu prevent the State's officials from forcing Robinson to 
pay. 
After a trial, the Bankruptcy Court entered a Memoran-
dum and Proposed Order, concluding that the 1981 discharge 
2 There is some uncertainty about the total amount Robinson was 
ordered to pay. Although the judge imposed restitution in a total amount 
of $9;932.95, five years of payments at one hundred dollars a month total 
only $6,000. 
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in bankruptcy had not altered the conditions of Robinson's 
probation. The court adopted the analysis it had applied in a 
similar case decided. one month earlier, In re Pellegrino 
(Pellegrino v. Division of Criminal Justice), 42 B. R. 129 
(Bkrtcy. Ct. Conn. 1984). In Pellegrino, the court began 
with the Bankruptcy Code's definitional sections. First, 
§ 101(11) defines a "debt" as a "liability on a claim." In turn, 
§ 101(4) defines a "claim" as a "right to payment, whether or 
not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliqui-
dated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, un-
disputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." Finally, 
§ 101(9) defines a "creditor" as an "entity that has a claim 
against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the 
order for relief concerning the debtor." 
The Bankruptcy Court then examined the statute under 
which the Connecticut judge had sentenced the debtor to pay 
restitution. Restitution appears as one of the conditions of 
probation enumerated in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30. Under 
that section, restitution payments are sent to the Probation 
Office. The payments then are forwarded to the victim. 
Although the Connecticut penal code does not provide for en-
forcement of the probation conditions by the victim, it does 
authorize the trial court to issue a warrant for the arrest of a 
criminal defendant who has violated a condition of probation. 
§53a-32. 
Because the Connecticut statute does not allow the victim 
to enforce a right to receive payment, the court concluded 
that neither the victim nor the Probation Office had a "right 
to payment," and hence neither was owed a "debt" under the 
Bankruptcy Code. It argued: "Unlike an obligation which 
arises out of a contractual, statutory or common law duty, 
here the obligation is rooted in the traditional responsibility 
of a state to protect its citizens by enforcing its criminal stat-
utes and to rehabilitate an offender by imposing a criminal 
sanction intended for that purpose." 42 B. R., at 133. The 
court acknowledged the tension between its conclusion and 
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the Code's expansive definition of debt, but found an excep-
tion to the statutory definition in "the long-standing tradition 
of restraint by federal courts from interference with tradi-
tional functions of state governments." I d., at 134. The 
court concluded that, even if the probation condition was a 
debt subject to bankruptcy jurisdiction, it was nondischarge-
able under § 523(a)(7) of the Code. That subsection provides 
that a discharge in bankruptcy does not affect any debt that 
"is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the 
benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for 
actual pecuniary loss." 
The court also concluded that the purpose of the restitution 
condition was "to promote the rehabilitation of the offender, 
not to compensate the victim." 42 B. R., at 137. It specifi-
cally rejected the argument that the restitution must be 
deemed compensatory because the amount precisely matched 
the victim's loss. It noted that the state statute allows an 
offender "to make restitution of the fruits of his offense or 
make restitution, in an amount he can afford to pay or pro-
vide in a suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused 
thereby," Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30(a)(4). In its view, the 
Connecticut statute focuses "upon the offender and not on the 
victim, and . . . restitution is part of the criminal penalty 
rather than compensation for a victim's actual loss." 42 
B. R., at 137. Thus, the Bankruptcy Court held that the 
bankruptcy discharge had not affected the conditions of 
Pellegrino's probation. The United States District Court for 
the District of Connecticut adopted the Bankruptcy Court's 
proposed dispositions of Pellegrino and this case without 
alteration. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. It 
first examined the Code's definition of debt. Although it 
recognized that most courts had reached the opposite conclu-
sion, the court decided that a restitution obligation imposed 
as a condition of probation is a debt. It relied on the legisla-
tive history of the Code that evinced Congress's intent to 
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broaden the definition of "debt" from the much narrower def-
inition of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The court also noted 
that anomalies might result from a conclusion that such an 
obligation is not a debt. Most importantly, nondebt status 
would deprive a state of the opportunity to participate in the 
distribution of the bankrupt's estate. 
Having concluded that restitution obligations are debts, 
the court turned to the question of dischargeability. The 
court stated that the appropriate Connecticut agency proba-
bly could have avoided discharge ofthe debt if it had objected 
under §§ 523(a)(2) or 523(a)(4) of the Code. 3 As no objec-
tions to discharge were filed, the court concluded that the 
State could rely only on § 523(a)(7), the subsection that pro-
vides for automatic nondischargeability for certain debts. 4 
The court then looked to the text of the Connecticut statute 
to determine whether Robinson's probation condition was 
"compensation for actual pecuniary loss" within the meaning 
of § 523(a)(7). But where the Bankruptcy Court had consid-
ered the entire state probation system, the· Court of Appeals 
focused only on the language that allows a restitution order 
to be assessed "for the loss or damage caused [by the crime]," 
3 Section 523(a)(2)(A) protects from discharge debts "for obtaining 
money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinance of credit, 
by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud." Section 
523(a)(4) protects from discharge debts "for fraud or defalcation while act-
ing in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny." Under § 523(c), 
debts that are protected from discharge only by § 523(a)(2) or § 523(a)(4) 
are discharged unless the credi~or files an objection to discharge during the 
bankruptcy proceedings. Because Robinson was convicted of larceny, one 
of the debts listed in§ 523(a)(4), it is quite likely that the Bankruptcy Court 
would have oun nondischargeable under that subsection. 
' The requirement that creditors object to discharge is limited on its 
face to paragraphs (2), (4) , and (6) of§ 523(a). Because paragraph 7 is not 
listed there, debts described in that paragraph are automatically non-
dischargeable , under the general rule prescribed in the opening clause of 
§ 523(a) (providing that a "discharge under section 727 . . . of this title does 
not discharge an individual debtor from any debt" listed in the paragraphs 
that follow). 
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Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30(a)(4). The court thought this lan-
guage compelled the conclusion that the probation condition 
was "compensation for actual pecuniary loss." It held, 
therefore, that this particular condition of Robinson's proba-
tion was not protected from discharge by § 523(a)(7). Ac-
cordingly, it reversed the District Court. 
We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari. 
We have jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1). We reverse. 
II 
The Court of Appeals' decision focused primarily on the 
language of §§ 101 and 523 of the Code. Of course, the 
"starting point in every case involving construction of a stat-
ute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring). But the text is only the starting point. As JusTICE 
O'CONNOR explained last Term, "'"In expounding a statute, 
we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a 
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to 
its object and policy.""' Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallen-
tire, 477 U. S. --, -- (1986) (quoting Mastro Plastics 
Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 350 U. S. 270, 285 
(1956) (quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 8 How. 
113, 122 (1849))). In this case, we must consider the lan-
guage of§§ 101 and 523 in light of the history of bankruptcy 
court deference to criminal judgments and in light of the in-
terests of the States in unfettered administration of their 
criminal justice systems. 
A 
Courts traditionally have been reluctant to interpret fed-
eral bankruptcy statutes to remit state criminal judgments. 
The present text of Title 11, commonly referred to as the 
Bankruptcy Code, was enacted in 1978 to replace the Bank-
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ruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544. 5 The treatment of 
criminal judgments under the Act of 1898 informs our under-
standing of the language of the Code. 
First, § 57 of the Act established the category of "allowa-
ble" debts. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ~57 (14th ed. 1977). 
Only if a debt was allowable could the creditor receive a share 
of the bankrupt's assets. See § 65a. For this case, it is im-
portant to note that § 57j excluded from the class of allowable 
debts penalties owed to government entities. That section 
provided: 
Debts owing to the United States, a State, a county, a 
·district, or a municipality as a penalty or forfeiture shall 
not be allowed, except for the amount of the pecuniary 
loss sustained by the act, transaction, or proceeding out 
of which the penalty or forfeiture arose. 30 Stat., 
at 561. 
Second, § 63 . established the separate category of "prov-
able" debts. See 3A Collier on Bankruptcy ~ 63 (14th ed. 
1975). Section 17 provided that a discharge in bankruptcy 
"release[d] a bankrupt from all of his provable debts," subject 
to several exceptions listed in later portions of § 17. Al-
though § 17 specifically excepted four types of debts from dis-
charge, it did not mention criminal penalties of any kind. 
The most natural construction of the Act, therefore, would 
have allowed criminal penalties to be discharged in bank-
ruptcy, even though the government was not entitled to a 
share of the bankrupt's estate. Congress had considered 
criminal penalties when it passed the Act; it clearly made 
them nonallowable. The failure expressly to make them 
' Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act several times between 1898 
and 1978. Congress also made numerous technical changes to the Code in 
the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 380. None of those changes is relevant to this 
decision. 
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nondischargeable at the same time offered substantial sup-
port for the view that the Act discharged those penalties. 
But the courts did not interpret the Act in this way. De-
spite the clear statutory language, most courts refused to 
allow a discharge in bankruptcy to affect the judgment of a 
state criminal court. In the leading case, the court 
reasoned: 
It might be admitted that sections 63 and 17 of the bank-
rupt act, if only the letter of those provisions be looked 
to, would embrace [criminal penalties]; but it is well set-
tled that there may be cases in which such literal con-
struction is not admissible .... It may suffice to say that 
nothing but a ruling from a higher court would convince 
me that congress, by any provision of the bankrupt act, 
intended to permit the discharge, under its operations, 
of any judgment entered by a state or federal court im-
posing a fine in the enforcement of criminal laws. . .. 
The provisions of the bankrupt act have reference alone 
to civil liabilities, as demands between debtor and credi-
tors, as such, and not to punishment inflicted pro bono 
publico for crimes committed." In reM oore, 111 F. 145, 
148-149 (WD Ky. 1901). 6 
This reasoning was so widely accepted by the time Congress 
enacted the new Code that a leading commentator could state 
flatly that "fines and penalties are not affected by a dis-
6 Although courts differed as to the boundaries of the exception, particu-
larly in cases involving nonmonetary sanctions, or sanctions imposed in 
civil proceedings, the reasoning of Moore was widely accepted. See, e. g., 
Parker v. United States, 153 F. 2d 66, 71 (CAl 1946) (citing Moore and 
noting that "[i]t was not in the contemplation of Congress that the federal 
bankruptcy power should be employed to pardon a bankrupt from the con-
sequences of a criminal offense"); Zwick v. Freeman, 373 F. 2d 110, 116 
(CA2 1967) (citing Moore and stating that "governmental sanctions are not 
regarded as debts even when they require monetary payments"). We 
have found only one federal court decision allowing a discharge under the 
Act to affect a sentence imposed by a criminal court. In re Alderson, 98 
F. 588 (W. Va. 1899). 
. • 
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charge." See lA Collier on Bankruptcy ~ 17.13, at 
1609-1610, and n. 10 (14th ed. 1979). 
Moreover, those few courts faced with restitution obliga-
tions imposed as part of criminal sentences applied the same 
reasoning to prevent a discharge in bankruptcy from affect-
ing such a condition of a criminal sentence. For instance, 
four years before Congress enacted the Code, the New York 
Supreme Court stated: 
A discharge in bankruptcy has no effect whatsoever 
upon a condition of restitution of a criminal sentence. A 
bankruptcy proceeding is civil in nature and is intended 
to relieve an honest and unfortunate debtor of his debts 
and to permit him to begin his financial life anew. A 
condition of restitution in a sentence of probation is a 
part of the judgment of conviction. It does not create a 
debt nor a debtor/creditor relationship between the per-
sons making and receiving restitution. As with any 
other condition of a probationary sentence it is intended 
as a means to insure the defendant will lead a law-
abiding life thereafter. State v. Mosesson , 78 Misc. 2d 
217, 218, 356 N. Y. S. 2d 483, 484 (1974) (citations 
omitted). 7 
Thus, Congress enacted the Code in 1978 against the back-
ground of an established judicial exception to discharge for 
criminal sentences, including restitution orders, an exception 
created in the face of a statute drafted with considerable care 
and specificity. 
Just last Term we declined to hold that the new Bank-
ruptcy Code silently abrogated another exception created by 
courts construing the old Act. In Midlantic National Bank 
v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 474 
U. S. -- (1986), a trustee in bankruptcy asked us to hold 
7 For other decisions adopting this reasoning, see State ex rel . Auerbach 
v. Topping Bros. , 79 Misc. 2d 260, 359 N. Y. S. 2d 985, 987- 988 (Crim. Ct. 
1974); State v. Washburn , 97 Cal. App. 3d 621, 625-626, 158 Cal. Rptr. 
822, 825 (1979) . 
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that the 1978 Code had implicitly repealed an exception to the 
trustee's abandonment power. Courts had created that ex-
ception out of deference to state health and safety regula-
tions, a consideration comparable to the States' interests 
implicated by this case. We stated: 
The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Con-
gress intends for legislation to change the interpretation 
of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent spe-
cific. The Court has followed this rule with particular 
care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. 
If Congress wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary 
exemption from non-bankruptcy law, "the intention 
would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or 
inferred from disputable considerations of convenience in 
administering the estate of the bankrupt." 4 7 4 U. S., at 
-- (quoting Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444 
(1904)) (citations omitted). 
B 
Our interpretation of the Code also must reflect the basis 
for this judicial exception, a deep conviction that federal 
bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state 
criminal proceedings. The right to formulate and enforce 
penal sanctions is an important aspect of the sovereignty re-
tained by the States. This Court has emphasized repeatedly 
"the fundamental policy against federal interference with 
state criminal prosecutions." Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 
37, 46 (1971). The Court of Appeals nevertheless found sup-
port for its holding in the fact that Connecticut officials 
probably could have ensured continued enforcement of their 
court's criminal judgment against Robinson had they ob-
jected to discharge under § 523(c). Although this may be 
true in many cases, it hardly justifies an interpretation of the 
1978 Act that is contrary to the long prevailing view that 
"fines and penalties are not affected by a discharge," lA 
Collier on Bankruptcy ~ 17.13, at 1610 (14th ed. 1979). 
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Moreover, reliance on a right to appear and object to dis-
charge would create uncertainties and impose undue burdens 
on state officials. In some cases it would require state pros-
ecutors to defend particular state criminal judgments before 
federal bankruptcy courts. 8 As JUSTICE BRENNAN has 
noted, federal adjudication of matters already at issue in 
state criminal proceedings can be "an unwarranted and un-
seemly duplication of the State's own adjudicative process." 
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 121 (1971) (opinion of BREN-
NAN, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 9 
Also, as Robinson's attorney conceded at oral argument, 
some restitution orders would not be protected from dis-
charge even if the state did appear and enter an objection to 
discharge. For example; a judge in a negligent homicide 
case might sentence the defendant to probation, conditioned 
on the defendant's paying the victim's husband compensation 
for the loss the husband sustained when the defendant killed 
his wife. It is not clear that such a restitution order would 
fit the terms of any of the exceptions to discharge listed in 
§ 523 other than § 523(a)(7). Thus, this interpretation of the 
Code would do more than force state prosecutors to defend 
state criminal judgments in federal bankruptcy court. In 
8 In many cases, of course, principles of issue preclusion would obviate 
the need for the bankruptcy court to reexamine factual questions, or inter-
pret state law. But differences between the elements of crimes and the 
provisions of § 523 frequently might hinder the application of issue preclu-
sion. Moreover, apart from the burden on state officials of following and 
participating in bankruptcy proceedings, it is unseemly to require state 
prosecutors to submit the judgments of their criminal courts to federal 
bankruptcy courts. 
9 Of course, federal courts often duplicate state adjudicative processes 
when they consider petitions for the writ of habeas corpus. But explicit 
reference in the Constitution, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, as well as several federal 
statutes, testify to the importance of the writ of habeas corpus. Here, the 
case for relitigation in the federal courts rests only on the ambiguous words 
of the Bankruptcy Code. 
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some cases, it could lead to federal remission of judgments 
imposed by state criminal judges. 
This prospect, in turn, would hamper the flexibility of state 
criminal judges in choosing the combination of imprisonment, 
fines, and restitution most likely to further the rehabilitative 
and deterrent goals of state criminal justice systems. 10 We 
will not lightly limit the rehabilitative and deterrent options 
available to state criminal judges. 
In one of our cases interpreting the Act, Justice Douglas 
remarked: "[W]e do not read these statutory words with the 
ease of a computer. There is an overriding consideration 
that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy 
jurisdiction." Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U. S. 99, 103 
(1966). This Court has recognized that the States' interest 
in administering their criminal justice systems free from fed-
eral interference is one of the most powerful of the consider-
ations that should influence a court considering equitable 
types of relief. See Younger v. Harris, supra, at 44-45. 
This reflection of our federalism also must influence our 
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code in this case. 11 
10 Restitution is an effective rehabilitative penalty because it forces the 
defendant to confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused. 
Such a penalty will affect the defendant differently than a traditional fine , 
paid to the State as an abstract and impersonal entity, and often calculated 
without regard to the harm the defendant has caused. Similarly, the di-
rect relation between the harm and the punishment gives restitution a 
more precise deterrent effect than a traditional fine. See Note, Victim 
Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 Harv. L. 
Rev. 931, 937-941 (1984). 
" Justice Frankfurter advocated a similar approach to the interpretation 
of regulatory statutes that infringe upon important state interests: 
The task is one of accommodation as between assertions of new federal au-
thority and historic functions of the individual states. Federal legislation 
of this character cannot therefore be construed without regacd to the impli-
cations of our dual system of government. . . . The underlying assumptions 
of our dual form of government, and the consequent presuppositions of leg-
islative draftsmanship which are expressive of our history· and habits, cut 
across what might otherwise be the implied range of legislation. The his-
85-1033-0PINION 
KELLY v. ROBINSON 13 
III 
In light of the established state of the law-that bank-
ruptcy courts could not discharge criminal judgments-we 
have serious doubts whether Congress intended to make 
criminal penalties "debts" within the meaning of § 101(4). 12 
But we need not address that question in this case, because 
we hold that § 523(a)(7) preserves from discharge any condi-
tion a state criminal court imposes as part of a criminal 
sentence. 
The relevant portion of§ 523(a)(7) protects from discharge 
any debt 
to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture 
payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, 
and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss. 
This language is subject to interpretation. On its face, 
§ 523(a)(7) certainly does not compel the co-nclusion reached 
by the Court of Appeals, that a discharge in bankruptcy voids 
restitution orders imposed as conditions of probation by state 
courts. Now here in the House and Senate Reports is there 
any indication that this language should be read so intru-
sively. 13 If Congress had intended, by § 523~)(7) or by any 
tory of congressional legislation ... justif[ies] the generalization that, 
when the Federal Government takes over such local radiations in the vast 
network of our national economic enterprise and thereby radically read-
justs the balance of state and national authority, those charged with the 
duty of legislating are reasonably explicit. Frankfurter, Some Reflections 
on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Col. L. Rev. 527, 539-540 (1947). 
12 We recognize, as the Court of Appeals emphasized, that the Code's 
definition of "debt" is broadly drafted, and that the legislative history: sup-
orb a broad reading of the definition. But nothing in the legislative his-
tory o ese sec 1 that Congress intended to change the state 
of the law with respect to criminal judgments. 
13 For the section-by-section analysis in the legislative reports, see H. R. 
Rep. No. 95-595, p. 363 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 79 (1978). For ex-
planations of the section by commentators, see 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 
~ 523.17 (15th ed. 1986); 1 Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 27.37 
(1981). In fact, both of these commentators expressly state that the Ian-
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other provision, to discharge state criminal sentences, "we 
can be certain that there would have been hearings, testi-
mony, and debate concerning consequences so wasteful, so 
inimical to purposes previously deemed important, and so 
likely to arouse public outrage," Tennessee Valley Authority 
v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 209 (1978) (POWELL, J., dissenting). 
Our reading of § 523(a)(7) differs from that of the Second 
Circuit. On its face, it creates a broad exception for all penal 
sanctions, whether they be denominated fines, penalties, or 
forfeitures. Congress included two qualifying phrases; the 
fines must be both "to and for the benefit of a governmental 
unit," and "not compensation for pecuniary loss." Section 
523(a)(7) protects traditional criminal fines; it codifies the 
judicially created exception to discharge for fines. We must 
decide whether the result is altered by the two major differ-
ences between restitution and a traditional fine. Unlike tra-
ditional fines, restitution is forwarded to the victim, and may 
be calculated by reference to the amount of harm the offender 
has caused. 
guage does not have the intrusive effect sought by Robinson. See Collier, 
~ 523.17, at 523-123 n. 4; Norton, § 27.37, at 55 n. 2. 
It seems likely that the limitation of§ 523(a)(7) to fines assessed "for the 
benefit of a federal, state, or local government" was intended to prevent 
application of that subsection to wholly private penalties such as punitive 
damages. See House Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 2, pp. 116, 141 (1973). As for 
the reference to "compensation for actual pecuniary loss," the Senate 
Report indicates that the main purpose of this language was to prevent 
§ 523(a)(7) from being applied to tax penalties. S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 79 
(1978). 
We acknowledge that a few comments in the hearings and the Bank-
ruptcy Laws Commission Report may suggest that the language bears the 
interpretation adopted by the Second Circuit. But none of those state-
ments was made by a member of Congress, nor were they included in the 
official Senate and House reports. We decline to accord any significance 
to these statements. Se~ McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 
488, 493-494 (1931); 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction 
§ 48.10, at 319, and n. 11 (rev. 4th ed. 1984). 
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In our view, neither of the qualifying clauses of§ 523(a)(7) 
allows the discharge of a criminal judgment that takes the 
form of restitution. The criminal justice system is not oper-
ated primarily for the benefit of victims, but for the benefit of 
society as a whole. Thus, it is concerned not only with pun-
ishing the offender, but also with rehabilitating him. Al-
though restitution does resemble a judgment "for the benefit 
of" the victim, the context in which it is imposed undermines 
that conclusion. The victim has no control over the amount 
of restitution awarded or over the decision to award restitu-
tion. Moreover, the decision to impose restitution generally 
does not turn on the victim's injury, but on the penal goals of 
the State and the situation of the defendant. As the bank-
ruptcy judge in this case recognized, "Unlike an obligation 
which arises out of a contractual, statutory or common law 
duty, here the obligation is rooted in the traditional respon-
sibility of a state· to protect its citizens by enforcing its crimi-
nal statutes and to rehabilitate an offender by imposing a 
criminal sanction intended for that purpose." 42 B. R., at 
133. 
This point is well illustrated by the Connecticut statute 
under which the restitution obligation was imposed. The 
statute authorizes a judge to impose any of eight specified 
conditions of probation, as well as "any other conditions 
reasonably related to his rehabilitation." Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§ 53a-30(a)(9). Clause (4) of that section authorizes a judge 
to require that the defendant 
make restitution of the fruits of his offense or make res-
titution, in an amount he can afford to pay or provide in a 
suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused thereby 
and the court may fix the amount thereof and the man-
ner of performance. 
This clause does not require imposition of restitution in the 
amount of the harm caused. Instead, it provides for a flexi-
ble remedy tailored to the defendant's situation. 
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Because criminal proceedings focus on the State's interests 
in rehabilitation and punishment, rather than the victim's de-
sire for compensation, we conclude that restitution orders im-
posed in such proceedings operate "for the benefit of" the 
State. Similarly, they are not assessed "for ... compensa-
tion" of the victim. The sentence following a criminal con-
viction necessarily considers the penal and rehabilitative in-
terests of the state. 14 Those interests are sufficient to place 
restitution orders within the meaning of § 523(a)(7). 
In light of the strong interests of the States, the uniform 
construction of the old Act over three-quarters of a century, 
and the absence of any significant evidence that Congress in-
tended to change the law in this area, we believe this result 
best effectuates the will of Congress. Accordingly, the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is 
Reversed. 
"This is not the only context in which courts have been forced to evalu-
ate the treatment of restitution orders by determining whether they are 
"compensatory" or "penal." Several lower courts have addressed the con-
stitutionality of the federal Victi itness rotection Act, 18 U. S. C. 
§ 3579. Under that Act, defendants have no right to jury trial as to the 
amount of restitution, even though the Seventh Amendment would require 
such a trial if the issue were decided in a civil case. See Note, The Right 
to a Jury Trial to Determine Restitution Under the Victim and Witness 
Protection Act of 1982, 63 Texas L. Rev. 671 (1984). Every federal circuit 
court that has considered the question has concluded that criminal defend-
ants contesting the assessment of restitution orders are not entitled to the 
protections. of the Seventh Amendment. See id., at 672 n. 18 (citing 
cases). 
.-
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Dear Sandra: 
Thank you for your letter of October 23 in which 
you suggest that "perhaps we should accept that the 
definition of debt includes restitution orders". It is 
true that such orders, under my opinion, would be 
protected in any event from discharge by §523(a) (7). 
My notes as to the Conference discussion indicate 
that some Justices were in doubt as to a restitution order 
would be a "debt" within the meaning of §101(4). As it is 
not necessary to decide this question in this case, I 
thought it prudent simply to leave the question open. I 
do think footnote 12, as presently drafted, can be read as 
implying a negative answer to the question left open. I 
2. 
could make the note entirely neutral by changing it to 
read: 
(Ronald: Here add the revision you suggest in your 
undated memorandum). 
I could make this change without clearing it with 
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Dear Sandra: 
Thank you for your letter of October 23 in which 
yo11 suggest that "perhaps we should accept that the ~efini­
tion of ~ebt ~ncludes restitution orders". lt is true that 
such 0rders, unner my opinion, wou1d be protected in any 
event from discharge by ~523(a) (7}. 
My notes on the Conference discussion indicate that 
some Justices were in ~oubt as to a whether a restitution 
order is a "debt" within th~ meaninq of §101(4}. I under-
stoo~ Darry to sav it is not ~ deht. As it is not necessary 
to decide this question in this case, 1 thought it prudent 
simpJy to leave the question open. 
I do think footnote 12, as presently drafted, can 
be read as implyinq a negative answer to the question left 
open. 1 could make the note entirely neutral by changing it 
to read: 
12. We recognize, as the Court of Appeals 
emphasized, that the Code's definition of 
"debt" is broadly drafted, and that the leg-
islative history, as well as the Code's vari-
ous nriority and discharqeability provisions, 
support a broad reading of the definition. 
But nothing in the legislative history of 
these sections compels the conclusion that 
Congress intended to change the state of the 
law with respect to criminal judgments. 
1 could make this change without clearing it with 
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Dear Lewis, 
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October 24, 1986 
No. 85-1033 Kelly v. Robinson 
I would appreciate seeing the change you 
suggest for FN 12. Thank you. It will remove some 
of the open-ended invitation for lower courts to go 
off on a less useful approach. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
october 24, 1986 
Re: 85-1033 - Kelly v. Robinson 
Dear Lewis: 
I shall await Thurgood's dissent. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Powell 
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SUPREME COURT OF TilE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1033 
JOHN J. KELLY, CONNECTICUT CHIEF STATE'S 
A'ITORNEY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
CAROLYN ROBINSON 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[October -, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We granted review in this case to decide whether restitu-
tion obligations, imposed as conditions of probation in state 
criminal proceedings, are dischargeable in proceedings under 
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
I 
In 1980, Carolyn Robinson pled guilty to larceny in the sec-
ond degree. The charge was based on her wrongful receipt 
of $9,932.95 in welfare benefits from the Connecticut Depart-
ment of Income Maintenance. On November 14, 1980, the 
Connecticut Superior Court sentenced Robinson to a prison 
term of not less than one year nor more than three years. 
The court suspended execution of the sentence and placed 
Robinson on probation for five years. As a condition of pro-
bation, the judge ordered Robinson to make restitution 1 to 
the State of Connecticut Office of Adult Probation (Probation 
1 Connecticut Gen. Stat. § 53a-30 sets out the conditions a trial court 
may impose on a sentence of probation. Clause 4 of that section authorizes 
a condition that the defendant "make restitution of the fruits of hi~ offense 
or make restitution, in an amount he can afford to pay or provide in a suit-
able manner, for the loss or damage caused thereby and the court may fix 
the amount thereof and the manner of performance." 
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Office) at the rate of $100 per month, commencing January 
16, 1981, and continuing until the end of her probation. 2 
On February 5, 1981, Robinson filed a voluntary petition 
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 701 et 
seq., in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District 
of Connecticut. That petition listed the restitution obliga-
tion as a debt. On February 20, 1981, the Bankruptcy Court 
notified both of the Connecticut agencies of Robinson's peti-
tion and infonned them that April27, 1981, was the deadline 
for filing objections to discharge. The agencies did not file 
proofs of claim or objections to discharge, apparently because 
they took the position that the bankruptcy would not affect 
the conditions of Robinson's probation. Thus, the agencies 
did not participate in the distribution of Robinson's estate. 
On May 14, 1981, the bankruptcy court granted Robinson a 
discharge. See § 727. 
At the time Robinson received her discharge in bank-
ruptcy, she had paid $450 in restitution. On May 20, 1981, 
her attorney wrote the Probation Office that he believed the 
discharge had altered the conditions of Robinson's probation, 
voiding the condition that she pay restitution. Robinson 
made no further payments. 
The Connecticut Probation Office did not respond to this 
letter until February 1984, when it infonned Robinson that it 
considered the obligation to pay restitution nondischarge-
able. Robinson responded by filing an adversary proceeding 
in the Bankruptcy Court, seeking a declaration that the res-
titution obligation had been disc~arged, as well as an injunc-
tion to prevent the State's officials from forcing Robinson to 
pay. 
After a trial, the Bankruptcy Court entered a Memoran-
dum and Proposed Order, concluding that the 1981 discharge 
z There is some uncertainty about the total amount Robinson was 
ordered to pay. Although the judge imposed restitution in a total amount 
., of $9,932.95, five years of payments at one hundred dollars a month total 
only $6,000. 
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in bankruptcy had not altered the conditions of Robinson's 
probation. The court adopted the analysis it had applied in a 
similar case decided one month earlier, In re Pellegrino 
(Pellegrino v. Division of Criminal Justice), 42 B. R. 129 
(Bkrtcy. Ct. Conn. 1984). In Pellegrino, the court began 
with the Bankruptcy Code's definitional sections. First, 
§ 101(11) defines a "debt" as a "liability on a claim." In turn, 
§ 101(4) defines a "claim" as a ''right to payment, whether or 
not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliqui-
dated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, un-
disputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." Finally, 
§ 101(9) defines a "creditor" as an "entity that has a claim 
against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the 
order for relief concerning the debtor." 
The Bankruptcy Court then examined the statute under 
which the Connecticut judge had sentenced the debtor to pay 
restitution. Restitution appears as one of the conditions of 
probation enumerated in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30. Under 
that section, restitution payments are sent to the Probation 
Office. The payments then are forwarded to the victim. 
Although the Connecticut penal code does not. provide for en-
forcement of the probation conditions by the victim, it does 
authorize the trial coUrt to issue a warrant for the arrest of a 
criminal defendant who has violated a condition of probation. 
§53a-32. 
Because the Connecticut statute does not allow the victim 
to enforce a right to receive payment, the court concluded 
that neither the victim nor the Probation Office had a "right 
to payment," and hence neither was owed a "debt" under the 
Bankruptcy Code. It argued: "Unlike an obligation which 
arises out of a contractual, statutory or common law duty, 
here the obligation is rooted in the traditional responsibility 
of a state to protect its citizens by enforcing its criminal stat-
utes and to rehabilitate an offender by imposing a criminal 
sanction intended for that purpose." 42 B. R., at 133. .The 
court acknowledged the tension between its conclusion and 
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the Code's expansive definition of debt, but found an excep-
tion to the statutory definition in "the long-standing tradition 
of restraint by federal courts from interference with tradi-
tional functions of state governments." I d., at 134. The 
court concluded that, even if the probation condition was a 
debt subject to bankruptcy jurisdiction, it was nondischarge-
able under § 523(a)(7) of the Code. That subsection provides 
that a discharge in bankruptcy does not affect any debt that 
''is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the 
benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for 
actual pecuniary loss." 
The court also concluded that the purpose of the restitution 
condition was "to promote the rehabilitation of the offender, 
not to compensate the victim." 42 B. R., at 137. It specifi-
cally rejected the argument that the restitution must be 
deemed compensatory because the amount precisely matched 
the victim's loss. It noted that the state statute allows an 
offender ''to make restitution of the fruits of his offense or 
make restitution, in an amount he can afford to pay or pro-
vide in a suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused 
thereby," Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30(a)(4). In its view, the 
Connecticut statute focuses ''upon the offender and not on the 
victim, and . . . restitution is part of the criminal penalty 
rather than compensation for a victim's actual loss." 42 
B. R., at 137. Thus, the Bankruptcy Court held that the 
bankruptcy discharge had not affected the conditions of 
Pellegrino's probation. The United States District Court for 
the District of Connecticut adopted the Bankruptcy Court's 
proposed dispositions of Pellegrino and this case without 
alteration. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. It 
first examined the Code's definition of debt. Although it 
recognized that most courts had reached the opposi~e conclu-
sion, the court decided that a restitution obligation imposed 
as a condition of probation is a debt. It relied on the legisla-
tive history of the Code that evinced Congress's intent to 
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broaden the definition of "debt" from the much narrower def-
inition of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The court also noted 
that anomalies might result from a conclusion that such an 
obligation is not a debt. Most importantly, nondebt status 
would deprive a state of the opportunity to participate in the 
distribution of the bankrupt's estate. 
Having concluded that restitution obligations are debts , 
the court turned to the question of dischargeability. The 
court stated that the appropriate Connecticut agency proba-
bly could have avoided discharge of the debt if it had objected 
under §§ 523(a)(2) or 523(a)(4) of the Code. 3 As no objec-
tions to discharge were filed, the court concluded that the . 
State could rely only on § 523(a)(7), the subsection that pro-
vides for automatic nondischargeability. for certain debts. 4 
The court then looked to the text of the Connecticut statute 
to determine whether Robinson's probation condition was 
"compensation for actual pecuniary loss" within the meaning 
of § 523(a)(7). But where the Bankruptcy Court had consid-
ered the entire state probation system, the Court of Appeals 
focused only on the language that allows a restitution order 
3 Section 523(a)(2)(A) protects from discharge debts "for obtaining 
money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinance of credit , 
by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud." Section 
523(a)(4) protects from discharge debts "for fraud or defalcation while act-
ing in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny." Under § 523(c), 
debts that are protected from discharge only by § 523(a)(2) or § 523(a)(4) 
are discharged unless the creditor files an objection to discharge during the 
bankruptcy proceedings. Because Robinson was convicted of larceny, one 
of the debts listed in § 523(a)(4), it is quite likely that the Bankruptcy I 
Court, if it had found the obligation to be a "debt," would have found it 
nondischargeable under that subsection. 
'The requirement that creditors object to discharge is limited on its 
face to paragraphs (2) , (4), and (6) of§ 523(a). Because paragraph 7 is not 
listed there, debts described in that paragraph are automatically non-
dischargeable, under the general rule prescribed in the opening clause of 
§ 523(a) (providing that a "discharge under section 727 . . . of this title does 
not discharge an individual debtor from any debt" listed in the paragraphs 
that follow). 
85-1033-0PINION 
6 KELLY v. ROBINSON 
to be assessed "for the loss or damage caused [by the crime]," 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30(a)(4). The court thought this lan-
guage compelled the conclusion that the probation condition 
was "compensation for actual pecuniary loss." It held, 
therefore, that this particular condition of Robinson's proba-
tion was not protected from discharge by § 523(a)(7). Ac-
cordingly, it reversed the District Court. 
We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari. 
We have jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1). We reverse. 
II 
The Court of Appeals' decision focused primarily on the 
language of §§ 101 and 523 of the Code. Of course, the 
"starting point in every case involving construction of a stat-
ute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring). But the text is only the starting point. As JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR explained last Term, "'"In expounding a statute, 
we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a 
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to 
its object and policy."'" Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallen-
tire, 477 U. S. --, -- (1986) (quoting Mastro Plastics 
Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 350 U. S. 270, 285 
(1956) (quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 8 How. 
113, 122 (1849))). In this case, we must consider the lan-
guage of§§ 101 and 523 in light of the history of bankruptcy 
court deference to criminal judgments and in light of the in-
terests of the States in unfettered administration of their 
criminal justice systems. 
A 
Courts traditionally have been reluctant to interpret fed-
eral bankruptcy statutes to remit state criminal judgments. 
The present text of Title 11, commonly referred to as the 
Bankruptcy Code, was enacted in 1978 to replace the Bank-
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ruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544. 5 The treatment of 
criminal judgments under the Act of 1898 informs our under-
standing of the language of the Code. 
First, § 57 of the Act established the category of "allowa-
ble" debts. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy~ 57 (14th ed. 1977). 
Only if a debt was allowable could the creditor receive a share 
of the bankrupt's assets. See § 65a. For this case, it is im-
portant to note that § 57j excluded from the class of allowable 
debts penalties owed to government entities. That section 
provided: 
Debts owing to the United States, a State, a county, a 
district, or a municipality as a penalty or forfeiture shall 
not be al~owed, except for the amount of the pecuniary 
loss sustained by the act, transaction, or proceeding out 
of which the penalty or forfeiture arose. 30 Stat., 
at 561. 
Second, § 63 established the separate category of "prov-
able" debts. See 3A Collier on Bankruptcy ~ 63 (14th ed. 
1975). Section 17 provided that a discharge in bankruptcy 
''release[d] a bankrupt from all of his provable debts," subject 
to several exceptions" listed in later :portions of § 17. Al-
though § 17 specifically excepted four types of debts from dis-
charge, it did not mention criminal penalties of any kind. 
The most natural construction of the Act, therefore, would 
have allowed criminal penalties to be discharged in bank-
ruptcy, even though the government was not entitled to a 
share of the bankrupt's estate. Congress had considered 
criminal penalties when it passed the Act; it clearly made 
them nonallowable. The failure expressly to make them 
~Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act several times between 1898 
and 1978. Congress also made numerous technical changes to the Code in 
the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 380. None of those changes is relevant to this 
decision. 
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nondischargeable at the same time offered substantial sup-
port for the view that the Act discharged those penalties. 
But the courts did not interpret the Act in this way. De-
spite the clear statutory language, most courts refused to 
allow a discharge in bankruptcy to affect the judgment of a 
state criminal court. In the leading case, the court 
reasoned: 
It might be admitted that sections 63 and 17 of the bank-
rupt act, if only the letter of those provisions be looked 
to, would embrace [criminal penalties]; but it is well set-
tled that there may be cases in which such literal con-
struction is not admissible .... It may suffice to say that 
nothing but a ruling from a higher court would convince 
me that congress, by any provision of the bankrupt act, 
intended to permit the discharge, under its operations, 
of any judgment entered by a state or federal court im-
posing a fine in the enforcement of criminal laws .... 
The provisions of the bankrupt act have reference alone 
to civil liabilities, as demands between debtor and credi-
tors, as such, and not to punishment inflicted pro bono 
publico for crimes committed." In reM oore, 111 F. 145, 
148-149 (WD Ky. 1901). 6 
This reasoning was so widely accepted by the time Congress 
enacted the new Code that a leading commentator could state 
flatly that "fines and penalties are not affected by a dis-
6 Although courts differed as to the boundaries of the exception, particu-
larly in cases involving nonmonetary sanctions, or sanctions imposed in 
civil proceedings, the reasoning of Moore was widely accepted. See, e. g., 
Parker v. United States, 153 F. 2d 66, 71 (CAl 1946) (citing Moore and 
noting that "[i]t was not in the contemplation of Congress that the federal 
bankruptcy power should be employed to pardon a bankrupt from the con-
sequences of a criminal offense"); Zwick v. Freeman , 373 F. 2d 110, 116 
(CA2 1967) (citing Moore and stating that "governmental sanctions are not 
regarded as debts even when they require monetary payments"). We 
have found only one federal court decision allowing a discharge under the 
Act to affect a sentence imposed by a criminal court. In re Alderson, 98 
F. ·588 (W. Va. 1899). 
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charge." See 1A Collier on Bankruptcy ~17.13, at 
1609-1610, and n. 10 (14th ed. 1979). 
Moreover, those few courts faced with restitution obliga-
tions imposed as part of criminal sentences applied the same 
reasoning to prevent a discharge in bankruptcy from affect-
ing such a condition of a criminal sentence. For instance, 
four years before Congress enacted the Code, the New York 
Supreme Court stated: 
A discharge in bankruptcy has no effect whatsoever 
upon a condition ofrestitution of a criminal sentence. A 
bankruptcy proceeding is civil in nature and is intended 
to relieve an honest and unfortunate debtor of his debts 
and to permit him to begin his financial life anew. A 
condition of restitution in a sentence of probation is a 
part of the judgment of conviction. It does not create a 
debt nor a debtor/creditor relationship between the per-
sons making and receiving restitution. As with any 
other condition of a probationary sentence it is intended 
as a means to insure the defendant will lead a law-
abiding life thereafter. State v. Mosesson, 78 Misc. 2d 
217, 218, 356 N. Y. S. 2d 483, 484 (1974) (citations 
omitted). 7 
Thus, Congress enacted the Code in 1978 against the back-
ground of an established judicial exception to discharge for 
criminal sentences, including restitution orders, an exception 
created in the face of a statute drafted with considerable care 
and specificity. 
Just last Term we declined to hold that the new Bank-
ruptcy Code silently abrogated another exceptidri created by 
courts construing the old Act. In Midlantic National Bank 
v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 474 
U. S. -- (1986), a trustee in bankruptcy asked us to hold 
7 For other decisions adopting this reasoning, see State ex rel. Auerbach 
v. Tawing Bros., 79 Misc. 2d 260, 359 N. Y. S. 2d 985, 987-988 (Crim. Ct. 
1974); State v. Washburn, 97 Cal. App. 3d 621, 625-626, 158 Cal. Rptr. 
822, 825 (1979). 
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that the 1978 Code had implicitly repealed an exception to the 
trustee's abandonment power. Courts had created that ex-
ception out of deference to state health and safety regula-
tions, a consideration comparable to the States' interests 
implicated by this case. We stated: 
The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Con-
gress intends for legislation to change the interpretation 
of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent spe-
cific. The Court has followed this rule with particular 
care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. 
If Congress wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary 
exemption from non-bankruptcy law, "the intention 
would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or 
inferred from disputable considerations of convenience in 
administering the estate ofthe bankrupt." 474 U.S., at 
-- (quoting Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444 
(1904)) (citations omitted). 
B 
Our interpretation of the Code also must reflect the basis 
for this judicial exception, a deep conviction that federal 
bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state 
criminal proceedings. The right to formulate and enforce 
penal sanctions is an important aspect of the sovereignty re-
tained by the States. This Court has emphasized repeatedly 
''the fundamental policy against federal interference with 
state criminal prosecutions." Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 
37, 46 (1971). The Court of Appeals nevertheless found sup-
port for its holding in the fact that Connecticut officials 
probably could have ensured continued enforcement of their 
court's criminal judgment against Robinson had they ob-
jected to discharge under § 523(c). Although this may be 
true in many cases, it hardly justifies an inter.pretation of the 
1978 Act that is contrary to the long prevailing view that 
"fines and penalties are not affected by a discharge," lA 
Collier on Bankruptcy ~ 17.13, at 1610 (14th ·ed. 1979). 
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Moreover, reliance on a right to appear and object to dis-
charge would create uncertainties and impose undue burdens 
on state officials. In some cases it would require state pros-
ecutors to defend particular state criminal judgments before 
federal bankruptcy courts.8 As JUSTICE BRENNAN has 
noted, federal adjudication of matters already at issue in 
state criminal proceedings can be "an unwarranted and un-
seemly duplication of the State's own adjudicative process." 
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 121 (1971) (opinion of BREN-
NAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 9 
Also, as Robinson's attorney conceded at oral argument, 
some restitution orders would not be protected from dis-
charge even if the stat~ did appear and enter an objection to 
discharge. For example, a judge in a negligent homicide 
case might sentence the defendant to probation, conditioned 
on the defendant's paying the victim's husband compensation 
for the loss the husband sustained when the defendant killed 
his wife. It is not clear that such a restitution order would 
fit the terms of any of the exceptions to discharge listed in 
§ 523 other than § 523(a)(7). Thus, this interpretation of the 
Code would do more than force state prosecutors to defend 
state criminal judgments in federal bankruptcy court. In 
1 In many cases, of course, principles of issue preclusion would obviate 
the need for the bankruptcy court to reexamine factual questions , or inter-
pret state law. But differences between the elements of crimes and the 
provisions of § 523 frequently might hinder the application of issue preclu-
sion. Moreover, apart from the burden on state officials of following and 
participating in bankruptcy proceedings, it is unseemly to require state 
prosecutors to submit the judgments of their criminal courts to federal 
bankruptcy courts. 
• Of course, federal courts often duplicate state adjudicative processes 
when they consider petitions for the writ of habeas corpus. But explicit 
reference in the Constitution, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, as well as several federal 
statutes, testify to the importance of the writ of habeas corpus. Here, the 
case for relitigation in the federal courts rests only on the ambiguous words 
of the Bankruptcy Code. 
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some cases, it could lead to federal remission of judgments 
imposed by state criminal judges. 
This prospect, in turn, would hamper the flexibility of state 
criminal judges in choosing the combination of imprisonment, 
fines, and restitution most likely to further the rehabilitative 
and deterrent goals of state criminal justice systems. 10 We 
will not lightly limit the rehabilitative and deterrent options 
available to state criminal judges. 
In one of our cases interpreting the Act, Justice Douglas 
remarked: "[W]e do not read these statutory words with the 
ease of a computer. There is an overriding consideration 
that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy 
jurisdiction." Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U. S. 99, 103 
(1966). This Court has recognized that the States' interest 
in administering their criminal justice systems free from fed-
eral interference is one of the most powerful of the consider-
ations that should influence a court considering equitable 
types of relief. See Younger v. Harris, supra, at 44-45. 
This reflection of our federalism also must influence our 
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code in this case. 11 
10 Restitution is an effective rehabilitative penalty because it forces the 
defendant to confront, in concrete tenns, the hann his actions have caused. 
Such a penalty will affect the defendant differently than a traditional fine , 
paid to the State as an abstract and impersonal entity, and often calculated 
without regard to the hann the defendant has caused. Similarly, the di-
rect relation between the hann and the punishment gives restitution a 
more precise deterrent effect than a traditional fine. See Note, Victim 
Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 Harv. L. 
Rev. 931, 937-941 (1984). 
11 Justice Frankfurter advocated a similar approach to the interpretation · 
of regulatory statutes that infringe upon important state interests: 
The task is one of accommodation as between assertions of new federal au-
thority and historic functions of the individual states. Federal legislation 
of this character cannot therefore be construed without regard to the impli-
cations of our dual system of government . .. . The underlying assumptions 
of our dual fonn of government, and the consequent presuppositions of leg-
islative draftsmanship which are expres~ive of our history and habits , cut 
across what might otherwise be the implied range of legislation. The his-
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III 
In light of the established state of the law-that bank-
ruptcy courts could not discharge criminal judgments-we 
have serious doubts whether Congress intended to make 
criminal penalties "debts" within the meaning of § 101(4). 12 
But we need not address that question in this case, because 
we hold that § 523(a)(7) preserves from discharge any condi-
tion a state criminal court imposes as part of a criminal 
sentence. 
The relevant portion of § 523(a)(7) protects from discharge 
any debt 
to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture 
payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, 
and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss. 
This language is subject to interpretation. On its face, 
§ 523(a)(7) certainly does not compel the conclusion reached 
by the Court of Appeals, that ~discharge in bankruptcy voids 
restitution orders imposed as conditions of probation by state 
courts. Now here in the House and Senate Reports is there 
any indication that this language should be read so intru-
sively.13 If Congress had intended, by § 523(a)(7) or by any 
tory of congressional legislation ... justif(ies) the generalization that, 
when the Federal Government takes over such local radiations in the vast 
network of our national economic enterprise and thereby radically read-
justs the balance of state and national authority' those charged with the 
duty of legislating are reasonably explicit. Frankfurter, Some Reflections 
on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Col. L. Rev. 527, 539-!)40 (1947). 
11 We recognize, as the Court of Appeals emphasized, that the Code's 
definition of "debt" is· broadly drafted, and that the legislative history, as \ 
well as the Code's various priority and dischargeability provisions, support 
a broad reading of the definition. But nothing in the legislative history of 
these sections compels the conclusion that Congress intended to change the I 
state of the law with respect to criminal judgments. 
13 For the section-by-section analysis in the legislative reports, see H. R. 
Rep. No. 95-595, p. 363 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 79 (1978). For ex-
planations of the section by commentators, see 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 
11523.17 (15th ed. 1986); 1 Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 27.37 
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other provision, to discharge state criminal sentences, "we 
can be certain that there would have been hearings, testi-
mony, and debate concerning consequences so wasteful, so 
inimical to purposes previously deemed important, and so 
likely to arouse public outrage," Tennessee Valley Authority 
v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 209 (1978) (POWELL, J., dissenting). 
Our reading of § 523(a)(7) differs from that of the Second 
Circuit. On its face, it creates a broad exception for all penal 
sanctions, whether they be denominated fines, penalties, or 
forfeitures. Congress included two qualifying phrases; the 
fines must be both "to and for the benefit of a governmental 
unit," and "not compensation for pecuniary loss." Section 
523(a)(7) protects traditional criminal fines; it codifies the 
judicially created exception to discharge for fines. We must 
decide whether the result is altered by the two major differ-
ences between restitution and a traditional fine. Unlike tra-
ditional fines, restitution is forwarded to the victim, and may 
be calculated by reference to the amount of harm the offender 
has caused. 
(1981). In fact, both of these commentators expressly state that the lan-
guage does not have the intrusive effect sought by Robinson. See Collier, 
~ 523.17, at 523-123 n. 4; Norton, § 27.37, at 55 n. 2. 
It seems likely that the limitation of§ 523(a)(7) to fines assessed "for the 
benefit of a federal, state, or local government" was intended to prevent 
application of that subsection to wholly private penalties such as punitive 
damages. See House Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 2, pp. 116, 141 (1973). As for 
the reference to "compensation for actual pecuniary loss," the Senate 
Report indicates that the main purpose of this language was to prevent 
§ 523(a)(7) from being applied to tax penalties. S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 79 
(1978). 
We acknowledge that a few comments in the hearings and the Bank-
ruptcy Laws Commission Report may suggest that the language bears the 
interpretation adopted by the Second Circuit. But none of those state-
ments was made by a member of Congress, nor were they included in the 
official Senate and House reports. We decline to accord any significance 
to these statements. See McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 
488, 493-494 (1931); 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction 
§ 48.10, ·at 319, and n. 11 (rev. 4th ed. 1984). 
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In our view; neither of the qualifying clauses of§ 523(a)(7) 
allows the discharge of a criminal judgment that takes the 
form of restitution. The criminal justice system is not oper-
ated primarily for the benefit of victims, but for the benefit of 
society as a whole. Thus, it is concerned not only with pun-
ishing the offender, but also with rehabilitating him. Al-
though restitution does resemble a judgment "for the benefit 
of" the victim, the context in which it is imposed undermines 
that conclusion. The victim has no control over the amount 
of restitution awarded or over the decision to award restitu-
tion. Moreover, the decision to impose restitution generally 
does not turn on the victim's injury, but on the penal goals of 
the State and the situation of the defendant. As the bank-
ruptcy judge in this case recognized, "Unlike an obligation 
which arises out of a contractual, statutory or common law 
duty, here the obligation is rooted in the traditional respon-
sibility of a state to protect its citizens by enforcing its crimi-
nal statutes and to rehabilitate an offender by imposing a 
criririnal sanction intended for that purpose." 42 B. R., at 
133. 
This point is well illustrated by the Connecticut statute 
under which the restitution obligation was imposed. The 
statute authorizes a judge to impose any of eight specified 
conditions of probation, as well as. "any· other conditions 
reasonably related to his rehabilitation." Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§ 53a-30(a)(9). Clause (4) of that section authorizes a judge 
to require that the defendant 
make restitution of the fruits of his offense or make res-
titution, in an amount he can afford to pay or provide in a 
suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused thereby 
and the court may fix the amount thereof and the man-
ner of performance. 
This clause does not require imposition of restitution in the 
amount of the harm caused. Instead, it provides for a flexi-
ble remedy tailored to the defendant's situation. 
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Because criminal proceedings focus on the State's interests 
in rehabilitation and punishment, rather than the victim's de-
sire for compensation, we conclude that restitution orders im-
posed in such proceedings operate ·"for the benefit of" the 
State. Similarly, they are not assessed "for ... compensa-
tion" of the victim. The sentence following a criminal con-
viction necessarily considers the penal and rehabilitative in-
terests of the state. 14 Those interests are sufficient to place 
restitution orders within the meaning of § 523(a)(7). 
In light of the strong interests of the States, the unifonn 
construction of the old Act over three-quarters of a century, 
and the absence of any significant evidence that Congress in-
tended to change the law in this area, we believe this result 
best effectuates the will of Congress. Accordingly, the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is 
Reversed. 
14 This is not the only context in which courts have been forced to evalu-
ate the treatment of restitution orders by determining whether they are 
"compensatory" or "penal." Several lower courts have addressed the con-
stitutionality of the federal Victim and Witness Protection A<;t, 18 U. S. C. 
§ 3579. Under that Act, defendants'have no right to jury trial as to the 
amount of restitution, even though the Seventh Amendment would require 
such a trial if the issue were decided in a civil case. See Note, The Right 
to a Jury Trial to Determine Restitution Under the Victim and Witness 
Protection Act of 1982, 63 Texas L. Rev. 671 (1984). Every federal circuit 
court that has considered the question has concluded that criminal defend-
ants contesting the assessment of restitution orders are not entitled to the 
protections of the Seventh Amendment. See id., at 672 n. 18 (citing 
cases). 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1033 
JOHN J. KELLY, CONNECTICUT CHIEF STATE'S 
ATTORNEY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
CAROLYN ROBINSON 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[November-, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We granted review in this case to decide whether restitu-
tion obligations, imposed as conditions of probation in state 
criminal proceedings, are dischargeable in proceedings under 
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
I 
In 1980, Carolyn Robinson pleaded guilty to larceny in 
the second degree. The charge was based on her wrongful 
receipt of $9,932.95 in welfare benefits from the Connecti-
cut Department of Income Maintenance. On November 14, 
1980, the Connecticut Superior Court sentenced Robinson to 
a prison term of not less than one year nor more than three 
years. The court suspended execution of the sentence and 
placed Robinson on probation for five years. As a condition 
of probation, the judge ordered Robinson to make restitu-
tion 1 to the State of Connecticut Office of Adult Probation 
(Probation Office) at the rate of $100 per month, commencing 
1 Connecticut Gen. Stat. § 53a-30 (1985), sets out the conditions a trial 
court may impose on a sentence of probation. Clause 4 of that section 
authorizes a condition that the defendant "make restitution of the fruits 
of his offense or make restitution, in an amount he can afford to pay or 
provide in a suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused thereby and 
the court may fix the amount thereof and the manner of performance." 
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January 16, 1981, and continuing until the end of her 
probation. 2 
On February 5, 1981, Robinson filed a voluntary petition 
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 701 et 
seq., in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District 
of Connecticut. That petition listed the restitution obliga-
tion as a debt. On February 20, 1981, the Bankruptcy Court 
notified both of the Connecticut agencies of Robinson's peti-
tion and informed them that April27, 1981, was the deadline 
for filing objections to discharge. The agencies did not file 
proofs of claim or objections to discharge, apparently because 
they took the position that the bankruptcy would not affect 
the conditions of Robinson's probation. Thus, the agencies 
did not participate in the distribution of Robinson's estate. 
On May 14, 1981, the Bankruptcy Court granted Robinson a 
discharge. See § 727. 
At the time Robinson received her discharge in bank-
ruptcy, she had paid $450 in restitution. On May 20, 1981, 
her attorney wrote the Probation Office that he believed the 
discharge had altered the conditions of Robinson's probation, 
voiding the condition that she pay restitution. Robinson 
made no further payments. 
The Connecticut Probation Office did not respond to this 
letter until February 1984, when it informed Robinson that it 
considered the obligation to pay restitution nondischarge-
able. Robinson responded by filing an adversary proceeding 
in the Bankruptcy Court, seeking a declaration that the res-
titution obligation had been discharged, as well as an injunc-
tion to prevent the State's officials from forcing Robinson 
to pay. 
After a trial, the Bankruptcy Court entered a memoran-
dum and proposed order, concluding that the 1981 discharge 
2 There is some uncertainty about the total amount Robinson was or-
dered to pay. Although the judge imposed restitution in a total amount of 
$9,932.95, five years of payments at one hundred doll~ a month total only 
$6,000. 
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in bankruptcy had not altered the conditions of Robinson's 
probation. Robinson v. McGuigan, 45 B. R. 423 (1984). 
The court adopted the analysis it had applied in a similar case 
decided one month earlier, In re Pellegrino (Pellegrino v. 
Division of Criminal Justice), 42 B. R. 129 (Conn. 1984). 
In Pellegrino, the court began with the Bankruptcy Code's 
definitional sections. First, § 101(11) defines a "debt" as a 
"liability on a claim." In turn, § 101(4) defines a "claim" 
as a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced 
to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, ma-
tured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, se-
cured, or unsecured." Finally, § 101(9) defines a "creditor" 
as an "entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at 
the time of or before the order for relief concerning the 
debtor." 
The Pellegrino Court then examined the statute under 
which the Connecticut judge had sentenced the debtor to pay 
restitution. Restitution appears as one of the conditions of 
probation enumerated in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30 (1985). 
Under that section, restitution payments are sent to the Pro-
bation Office. The payments then are forwarded to the vic-
tim. Although the Connecticut penal code does not provide 
for enforcement of the probation conditions by the victim, it 
does authori~e the trial court to issue a warrant for the arrest 
of a criminal defendant who has violated a condition of proba-
tion. § 53a-32. 
Because the Conn~cticut statute does not allow the victim 
to enforce a right to receive payment, the court concluded 
that neither the victim nor the Probation Office had a "right 
to payment," and hence neither was owed a "debt" under the 
Bankruptcy Code. It argued: "Unlike an obligation which 
arises out of a contractual, statutory or common law duty, 
here the obligation is rooted in the traditional responsibility 
of a state to protect its citizens by enforcing its criminal stat-
utes and to rehabilitate an offender by imposing a criminal 
sanction intended for that purpose." 42 B. R., at 133. The 
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court acknowledged the tension between its conclusion and 
the Code's expansive definition of debt, but found an excep-
tion to the statutory definition in "the long-standing tradition 
of restraint by federal courts from interference with tradi-
tional functions of state governments." I d., at 134. The 
court concluded that, even if the probation condition was a 
debt subject to bankruptcy jurisdiction, it was nondischarge-
able under § 523(a)(7) of the Code. That subsection provides 
that a discharge in bankruptcy does not affect any debt that 
"is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the 
benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for 
actual pecuniary loss." 
.The court also concluded that the purpose of the restitution 
condition was "to promote the rehabilitation of the offender, 
not to compensate the victim." 42 B. R., at 137. It specifi-
cally rejected the argument that the restitution must be 
deemed compensatory because the amount precisely matched 
the victim's loss. It noted that the state statute allows an 
offender to "make restitution of the fruits of his offense or 
make restitution, in an amount he can afford to pay or pro-
vide in a suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused 
thereby," Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30(a)(4) (1985). In its 
view, the Connecticut statute focuses "upon the offender and 
not on the victim, and . . . restitution is part of the criminal 
penalty rather than compensation for a victim's actual loss." 
42 B. R., at 137. Thus, the Bankruptcy Court held that the 
bankruptcy discharge had not affected the conditions of 
Pellegrino's probation. The United States District Court for 
the District of Connecticut adopted the Bankruptcy Court's 
proposed dispositions of Pellegrino and this case without 
alteration. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. In 
re Robinson, 776 F. 2d 30 (1985). It first examined the 
Code's definition of debt. Although it recognized that most 
courts had reached the opposite conclusion, the court decided 
that a restitution obligation imposed as a condition of proba-
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tion is a debt. It relied on the legislative history of the Code 
that evinced Congress' intent to broaden the definition of 
"debt" from the much narrower definition of the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1898. The court also noted that anomalies might re-
sult from a conclusion that such an obligation is not a debt. 
Most importantly, nondebt status would deprive a State of 
the opportunity to participate in the distribution of the bank-
rupt's estate. 
Having concluded that restitution obligations are debts, 
the court turned to the question of dischargeability. The 
court stated that the appropriate Connecticut agency proba-
bly could have avoided discharge of the debt if it had objected 
under §§ 523(a)(2) or 523(a)(4) of the Code. 3 As no objec-
tions to discharge were filed, the court concluded that the 
State could rely only on § 523(a)(7), the subsection that pro-
vides for automatic nondischargeability for certain debts. 4 
The court then looked to the text of the Connecticut statute 
to determine whether Robinson's probation condition was 
"compensation for actual pecuniary loss" within the meaning 
of § 523(a)(7). But where the Bankruptcy Court had consid-
3 Section 523(a)(2)(A) protects from discharge debts "for obtaining 
money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinance of credit, 
by . .. false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud." Section 
523(a)(4) protects from discharge debts "for fraud or defalcation while 
acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny." Under§ 523(c), 
debts that are protected from discharge only by § 523(a)(2) or § 523(a)(4) 
are discharged unless the creditor files an objection to discharge during the 
bankruptcy proceedings. Because Robinson was convicted oflarceny, one 
of the debts listed in § 523(a)(4), it is quite likely that the Bankruptcy 
Court, if it had found the obligation to be a "debt," would have found it non-
dischargeable under that subsection. 
'The requirement that creditors object to discharge is limited on its 
face to paragraphs (2), (4) , and (6) of § 523(a). Because ~ 7 is not listed 
there, debts described in that paragraph are automatically nondischarge-
able, under the general rule prescribed in the opening clause of § 523(a) 
(providing that a "discharge under section 727 . . . of this title does not 
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ered the entire state probation system, the Court of Appeals 
focused only on the language that allows a restitution order 
to be assessed "for the loss or damage caused [by the crime]," 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-30(a)(4) (1985). The court thought 
this language compelled the conclusion that the probation 
condition was "compensation for actual pecuniary loss." It 
held, therefore, that this particular condition of Robinson's 
probation was not protected from discharge by § 523(a)(7). 
Accordingly, it reversed the District Court. 
We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari. 
475 U. S. -- (1986). We have jurisdiction to review the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1254(1). We reverse. 
II 
The Court of Appeals' decision focused primarily on the 
language of §§ 101 and 523 of the Code. Of course, the 
"starting point in every case involving construction of a stat-
ute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring). But the text is only the starting point. As JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR explained last Term, "'"In expounding a statute, 
we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a 
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to 
its object and policy.""' Offshore Logistics , Inc. v. Tallen-
tire, 477 U. S. --, -- (1986) (quoting Mastro Plastics 
Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U. S. 270, 285 (1956) (quoting United 
States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 8 How. 113, 122 (1849))). In this 
case, we must consider the language of§§ 101 and 523 in light 
of the history of bankruptcy court deference to criminal judg-
ments and in light of the interests of the States in unfettered 
administration of their criminal justice systems. 
A 
Courts traditionally have been reluctant to interpret fed-
eral bankruptcy statutes.to remit state criminal judgments. 
The present text of Title 11, commonly referred to as the 
--............,.-:------,---:--'---:-~~:---------------------------~-·--·--
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Bankruptcy Code, was enacted in 1978 to replace the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544. 5 The treatment of 
criminal judgments under the Act of 1898 informs our under-
standing of the language of the Code. 
First, § 57 of the Act established the category of "allowa-
ble" debts. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ~57 (14th ed. 1977). 
Only if a debt was allowable could the creditor receive a share 
of the bankrupt's assets. See § 65a. For this case, it is im-
portant to note that § 57j excluded from the class of allowable 
debts penalties owed to government entities. That section 
provided: 
"Debts owing to the United States, a State, a county, a 
district, or a municipality as a penalty or forfeiture shall 
not be allowed, except for the amount of the pecuniary 
loss sustained by the act, transaction, or proceeding out 
of which the penalty or forfeiture arose." 30 Stat. 561. 
Second, § 63 established the separate category of "prov-
able" debts. See 3A Collier on Bankruptcy ~ 63 (14th ed. 
1975). Section 17 provided that a discharge in bankruptcy 
"release[d] a bankrupt from all of his provable debts," subject 
to several exceptions listed in later portions of § 17. Al-
though § 17 specifically excepted four types of debts from dis-
charge, it did not mention criminal penalties of any kind. 
The most natural construction of the Act, therefore, would 
have allowed criminal penalties to be discharged in bank-
ruptcy, even though the government was not entitled to a 
share of the bankrupt's estate. Congress had considered 
criminal penalties when it passed the Act; it clearly made 
them nonallowable. The failure expressly to make them 
nondischargeable at the same time offered substantial sup-
port for the view that the Act discharged those penalties. 
6 Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act several times between 1898 
and 1978. Congress also made numerous technical changes to the Code 
in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. 
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But the courts did not interpret the Act in this way. 
Despite the clear statutory language, most courts refused to 
allow a discharge in bankruptcy to affect the judgment of a 
state criminal court. In the leading case, the court 
reasoned: 
"It might be admitted that sections 63 and 17 of the 
bankrupt act, if only the letter of those provisions be 
looked to, would embrace [criminal penalties]; but it is 
well settled that there may be cases in which such literal 
construction is not admissible. . . . It may suffice to say 
that nothing but a ruling from a higher court would con-
vince me that congress, by any provision of the bankrupt 
act, intended to permit the discharge, under its opera-
tions, of any judgment rendered by a state or federal 
court imposing a fine in the enforcement of criminal 
laws .... The provisions of the bankrupt act have refer-
ence alone to dvilliabilities, as demands between debtor 
and creditors, as such, and not to punishment inflicted 
pro bono publico for crimes committed." In re Moore, 
111 F. 145, 148-149 (WD Ky. 1901).6 
This reasoning was so widely accepted by the time Congress 
enacted the new Code that a leading commentator could state 
flatly that "fines and penalties are not affected by a dis-
charge." See lA Collier on Bankruptcy ~17.13, pp. 1609-
1610, and n. 10 (14th ed. 1978). 
6 Although courts differed as to the boundaries of the exception, particu-
larly in cases involving nonmonetary sanctions, or sanctions imposed in 
civil proceedings, the reasoning of Moore was widely accepted. See, e. g., 
Parker v. United States, 153 F . 2d 66, 71 (CAl 1946) (citing Moore and 
noting that "[i]t was not in the contemplation of Congress that the federal 
bankruptcy power should be employed to pardon a bankrupt from the con-
sequences of a criminal offense"); Zwick v. Freeman, 373 F . 2d 110, 116 
(CA2 1967) (citing Moore and stating that "governmental sanctions are not 
regarded as debts even when they require monetary payments"). We 
have found only one federal court decision allowing a discharge under the 
Act to affect a sentence imposed by a criminal court. In re Alderson, 98 
F. 588 (W. Va. 1899). 
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Moreover, those few courts faced with restitution obliga-
tions imposed as part of criminal sentences applied the same 
reasoning to prevent a discharge in bankruptcy from affect-
ing such a condition of a criminal sentence. For instance, 
four years before Congress enacted the Code, a New York 
Supreme Court stated: 
"A discharge in bankruptcy has no effect whatsoever 
upon a condition of restitution of a criminal sentence. A 
bankruptcy proceeding is civil in nature and is intended 
to relieve an honest and unfortunate debtor of his debts 
and to permit him to begin his financial life anew. A 
condition of restitution in a sentence of probation is a 
part of the judgment of conviction. It does not create a 
debt nor a debtor-creditor relationship between the per-
sons making and receiving restitution. As with any 
other condition of a probationary sentence it is intended 
as a means to insure the defendant will lead a law-
abiding life thereafter." State v. Mosesson, 78 Misc. 2d 
217, 218, 356 N. Y. S. 2d 483, 484 (1974) (citations 
omitted). 7 
Thus, Congress enacted the Code in 1978 against the back-
ground of an established judicial exception to discharge for 
criminal sentences, including restitution orders, an exception 
created in the face of a statute drafted with considerable care 
and specificity. 
Just last Term we declined to hold that the new Bank-
ruptcy Code silently abrogated another exception created by 
courts construing the old Act. In Midlantic National Bank 
v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, 474 U. S. 
-- (1986), a trustee in bankruptcy asked us to hold that the 
1978 Code had implicitly repealed an exception to the trust-
ee's abandonment power. Courts had created that exception 
7 For other decisions adopting this reasoning, see People v. Topping 
Bros., 79 Misc. 2d 260, 262, 359 N. Y. S. 2d 985, 987-988 (Crim. Ct. 1974); 
People v. Washburn, 97 Cal. App. 3d 621, 625-626, 158 Cal. Rptr. 822, 825 
(1979). 
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out of deference to state health and safety regulations, a con-
sideration comparable to the States' interests implicated by 
this case. We stated: 
"The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Con-
gress intends for legislation to change the interpretation 
of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent spe-
cific. The Court has followed this rule with particular 
care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. 
If Congress wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary 
exemption from nonbankruptcy law, 'the. intention would 
be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred 
from disputable considerations of convenience in admin-
istering the estate of the bankrupt.'~' I d., at-- (quot-
ing Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444 (1904)) (cita-
tions omitted). 
.B 
Our interpretation of the Code also must reflect the basis 
for this judicial exception, a deep conviction that federal 
bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state 
criminal proceedings. The right to formulate and enforce 
penal sanctions is an important aspect of the sovereignty re-
tained by the States. This Court has emphasized repeatedly 
"the fundamental policy against federal interference with 
state criminal prosecutions." Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 
37, 46 (1971). The Court of Appeals nevertheless found sup-
port for its holding in the fact that Connecticut officials 
probably could have ensured continued enforcement of their 
court's criminal judgment against Robinson had they ob-
jected to discharge under § 523(c). Although this may be 
true in many cases, it hardly justifies an interpretation of the 
1978 A~t that is contrary to the long prevailing view that 
"fines and penalties are not affected by a discharge," lA 
Collier on Bankruptcy~ 17.13, at 1610 (14th ed. 1979). 
Moreover, reliance on a right to appear and object to dis-
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on state officials. In some cases it would require state pros-
ecutors to defend particular state criminal judgments before 
federal bankruptcy courts. 8 As JUSTICE BRENNAN has 
noted, federal adjudication of matters already at issue in 
state criminal proceedings can be "an unwarranted and un-
seemly duplication of the State's own adjudicative process." 
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 121 (1971) (opinion concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). 9 
Also, as Robinson's attorney conceded at oral argument, 
some restitution orders would not be protected from dis-
charge even if the State did appear and enter an objection to 
discharge. For example, a judge in a negligent homicide 
case might sentence the defendant to probation, conditioned 
on the defendant's paying the victim's husband compensation 
for the loss the husband sustained when the defendant killed 
his wife. It is not clear that such a restitution order would 
fit the terms of any of the exceptions to discharge listed in 
§ 523 other than § 523(a)(7). Thus, this interpretation of the 
Code would do more than force state prosecutors to defend 
state criminal judgments in federal bankruptcy court. In 
some cases, it could lead to federal remission of judgments 
imposed by state criminal judges. 
8 In many cases, of course, principles of issue preclusion would obviate 
the need for the bankruptcy court to reexamine factual questions, or inter-
pret state law. But differences between the elements of crimes and the 
provisions of § 523 frequently might hinder the application of issue pre-
clusion. Moreover, apart from the burden on state officials of following 
and participating in bankruptcy proceedings, it is unseemly to require 
state prosecutors to submit the judgments of their criminal courts to fed-
eral bankruptcy courts. 
9 Of course, federal courts often duplicate state adjudicative processes 
· when they consider petitions for the writ of habeas corpus. But explicit 
reference in the Constitution, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, as well as several federal 
statutes, testifies to the importance of the writ of habeas corpus. Here, 
the case for relitigation in the federal courts rests only on the ambiguous 
words of the Bankruptcy Code. 
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This prospect, in turn, would hamper the flexibility of state 
criminal judges in choosing the combination of imprisonment, 
fines, and restitution most likely to further the rehabilitative 
and deterrent goals of state criminal justice systems. 10 We 
do not think Congress lightly would limit the rehabilitative 
and deterrent options available to state criminal judges. 
In one of our cases interpreting the Act, Justice Douglas 
remarked: "[W]e do not read these statutory words with the 
ease of a computer. There is an overriding consideration 
that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy 
jurisdiction." Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U. S. 99, 103 
(1966). This Court has recognized that the States' interest 
in administering their criminal justice systems free from fed-
eral interference is one of the most powerful of the consider-
ations that should influence a court considering equitable 
types of relief. See Younger v. Harris, supra, at 44-45. 
This reflection of our federalism also must influence our 
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code in this case. 11 
10 Restitution is an effective rehabilitative penalty because it forces the 
defendant to confront, in concrete tenns, the hann his actions have caused. 
Such a penalty will affect the defendant differently than a traditional fine , 
paid to the State as an abstract and impersonal entity, and often calcu-
lated without regard to the hann the defendant has caused. Similarly, the 
direct relation between the hann and the punishment gives restitution a 
more precise deterrent effect than a traditional fine. See Note, Victim 
Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 Harv. L. 
Rev. 931, 937-941 (1984). 
"Justice Frankfurter advocated a similar approach to the interpretation 
of regulatory statutes- that infringe upon important state interests: 
"The task is one of accommodation as between assertions of new federal 
authority and historic functions of the individual states. Federal legisla-
tion of this character cannot therefore be construed without regard to the 
implications of our dual system of government. . . . The underlying as-
sumptions of our dual fonn of government, and the consequent presupposi-
tions of legislative draftsmanship which are expressive of our history and 
habits, cut across what might otherwise be the implied ra:nge of legislation. 
The history of congressional legislation ... justif[ies] the generalization 
that, when the Federal Government takes over such local radiations in the 
---~--------~-----------------------------·-------·--- -----·· --. 
85-1033--0PINION 
KELLY v. ROBINSON 13 -
III 
In light of the established state of the law-that bank-
ruptcy courts could not discharge criminal judgments-we 
have serious doubts whether Congress intended to make 
criminal penalties "debts" within the meaning of § 101(4). 12 
But we need not address that question in this case, because 
we hold that § 523(a)(7) preserves from discharge any condi-
tion a state criminal court imposes as part of a criminal 
sentence. 
The relevant portion of § 523(a)(7) protects from discharge 
any debt 
"to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeit-
ure payable to and for the benefit of a governmental 
unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss." 
·This language is subject to interpretation. On its face, 
§ 523(a)(7) certainly does not compel the conclusion reached 
by the Court of Appeals, that a discharge in bankruptcy voids 
restitution orders imposed as conditions of probation by state 
courts. Now here in the House and Senate Reports is there 
any indication that this language should be read so intru-
sively.'3 If Congress had intended, by_§ 523(a)(7) or by any 
vast network of our national economic enterprise and thereby radically re-
adjusts the balance of state and national authority, those charged with the 
duty of legislating are reasonably explicit." Frankfurter, Some Reflec-
tions on ~he Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 539-540 (1947). 
'
2 We recognize, as the Court of Appeals emphasized, that the Code's 
definition of "debt" is broadly drafted, and that the legislative history, as 
well as the Code's various priority and dischargeability provisions, support 
a broad reading of the definition. But nothing in the legislative history of 
these sections compels the conclusion that Congress intended to change the 
state of the law with respect to criminal judgments. 
'
8 For the section-by-section analysis in the legislative Reports , see 
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 363 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 79 (1978). 
For explanations of the section by commentators, see 3 Collier on Bank-
ruptcy~ 523.17 (15th ed. 1986); 1 W. Norton, Bankruptcy Law and Practice 
§ 27.37 (1982). In fact, both of these commentators expressly state that 
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other provision, to discharge state criminal sentences, "we 
can be certain that there would have been hearings, testi-
mony, and debate concerning consequences so wasteful, so 
inimical to purposes previously deemed important, and so 
likely to arouse public outrage," TV A v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 
209 (1978) (POWELL, J., dissenting). 
Our reading of § 523(a)(7) differs from that of the Second 
Circuit. On its face, it creates a broad exception for all penal 
sanctions, whether they be denominated fines, penalties, or 
forfeitures. Congress included two qualifying phrases; the 
fines must be both "to and for the benefit of a governmental 
unit," and "not compensation for actual pecuniary loss." 
Section 523(a)(7) protects traditional criminal fines; it codifies 
the judicially created exception to discharge for fines. We 
must decide whether the result is altered by the two major 
differences between restitution and a traditional fine. Un-
like traditional fines, restitution is forwarded to the victim, 
and may be calculated by reference to the amount of harm the 
offender has caused. 
In our view, neither of the qualifying clauses of § 523(a)(7) 
allows the discharge of a criminal judgment that takes the 
the language does not have the intrusive effect sought by Robinson. See 
Collier, H23,17, at 523-123, n. 4; Norton, § 27.37, at 55, n. 2. 
It seems likely that the limitation of § 523(a)(7) to fines assessed "for the 
benefit of a governmental unit" was intended to prevent application of 
that subsection to wholly private penalties such as punitive damages. See 
House Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 2, pp. 116, 141 (1973). As for tl1e reference to 
"compensation for actual pecuniary loss," the Senate Report indicates that 
the main purpose of this language was to prevent § 523(a)(7) from being 
applied to tax penalties. S. Rep. No. 95-989, supra, at 79. 
We acknowledge that a few comments in the hearings and the Bank-
ruptcy Laws Commission Report may suggest that the language bears the 
interpretation adopted by the Second Circuit. But none of those state-
ments was made by a Member of Congress, nor were they included in the 
official Senate and House Reports. We decline to accord any significance 
to these statements. See McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 
488, 493-494 (1931); 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction 
§ 48.10, pp. 319, and 321, n. 11 (4th ed. 1984). 
----------·------------·------- -·---·· -
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form of restitution. The criminal justice system is not oper-
ated primarily for the benefit of victims, but for the benefit of 
society as a whole. Thus, it is concerned not only with pun-
ishing the offender, but also with rehabilitating him. Al-
though restitution does resemble a judgment "for the benefit 
of" the victim, the context in which it is imposed undermines 
that conclusion. The victim has no control over the amount 
of restitution awarded or over the decision to award restitu-
tion. Moreover, the decision to impose restitution generally 
does not turn on the victim's injury, but on the penal goals of 
the State and the situation of the defendant. As the Bank-
ruptcy Judge who decided this case noted in Pellegrino, "Un-
like an obligation which arises out of a contractual, statutory 
or common law duty, here the obligation is rooted in the tra-
ditional responsibility of a state to protect its citizens by 
enforcing its criminal statutes and to rehabilitate an offender 
by imposing a criminal sanction intended for that purpose." 
42 B.. R., at 133. 
This point is well illustrated by the Connecticut statute 
under which the restitution obligation was imposed. The 
statute authorizes a judge to impose any of eight specified 
conditions of probation, as well as "any other conditions 
reasonably related to his rehabilitation." Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§ 53a-30(a)(9) (1985). Clause (4) of that section authorizes a 
judge to require that the defendant 
"make restitution of the fruits of his offense or make res-
titution, in an amount he can afford to pay or provide in a 
suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused thereby 
and the court may fix the amount thereof and the man-
ner of performance." 
This clause does not require imposition of restitution in the 
amount of the harm caused. Instead, it provides for a flexi-
ble remedy tailored to the defendant's situation. 
Because criminal proceedings focus on the State's interests 
in rehabilitation ~nd punishment, rather than the victim's 
desire for compensation, we conclude that restitution orders 
---.. ------- - .---~ ... ~--- ---
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imposed in such proceedings operate "for the benefit of" the 
State. Similarly, they are not assessed "for ... compensa-
tion" of the victim. The sentence following a criminal con-
viction necessarily considers the penal and rehabilitative in-
terests of the State. 14 Those interests are sufficient to place 
restitution orders within the meaning of § 523(a)(7). 
In light of the strong interests of the States, the uniform 
construction of the old Act over three-quarters of a century, 
and the absence of any significant evidence that Congress in-
tended to change the law in this area, we believe this result 
best effectuates the will of Congress. Accordingly, the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is 
Reversed. 
14 This is not the only context in which courts have been forced to evalu-
ate the treatment of restitution orders by determining whether they are 
"compensatory" or "penal." Several lower courts have addressed the con-
stitutionality of the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U. S. C. 
§ 3579. Under that Act, defendants have no right to jury trial as to the 
amount of restitution, even though the Seventh Amendment would require 
such a trial if the issue were decided in a civil case. See Note, The Right 
to a Jury Trial to Determine Restitution Under the Victim and Witness 
Protection Act of 1982, 63 Texas L. Rev. 671 (i984). Every Federal Court 
(}f Appeals that has considered the question has concluded that criminal 
defendants contesting the assessment of restitution orders are not entitled 
to the protections of the Seventh Amendment. See id., at 672, n. 18 (cit-
ing cases). 
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85-1033 Kelly v. Robinson 
This case comes to us from the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit. It presents the 
question whether a restitution order,~imposed as a 
condition of probation by a state criminal court / can 
be discharged in bankruptcy. 
Robinson was convicted of ~r:~gY in a 




government agency/ from which she had stolen 
Thereafter, she filed for bankruptcy under 
J 
7 of the Bankruptcy Code,; and eventually 
received a discharge. 
- --~ 5~7~~--tt.t) 
A .ie  A Connecticut sought to 
enforce the restitution order against Robinson. The 
b~kru~tc~ court held that the discharge in bankruptcy 
had not affected the restitution order. The District 
Court affirmed, but the Court of Appeals reversed. 
For the reasons stated in our opinion filed 
today with the Clerk, we find that the restitution 
order was not discharged. We do not think Congress -
intended, when it enacted the new Code in 1978, to 
2. 
~-bv/~, 
change the judicially created rule that such orders are 
A J 
not dischargeable. -
Restitution is an important, and frequently 
used, means of punishment in criminal cases. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
Justice Marshall has filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which Justice Stevens has joined. 
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Restitution Recommended ~ 
C AROLYN ROBINSON probably thought she had found a great loophole. The Connecti-cut woman, charged with welfare fraud, 
pleaded guilty to wrongfully receiving $9,932.95 
in benefits. A judge sentenced her to one to three 
years in prison but suspended that penalty and 
placed her on probation. As a condition of proba-
tion, however, she was ordered to pay restitution 
to the state at the rate of $100 a month. Three 
weeks after her first payment, Miss Robinson 
filed a bankruptcy petition in federal court, and 
when her petition was granted a few months 
later, her lawyer advised her probation officer 
that she wouldn't be making any more payments. 
It sounds a lot easier than three years in prison, 
doesn't it? 
Unfortunately for Miss Robinson, the Supreme 
Court caught up with her this week when it ruled 
· that obligations to pay restitution to the victim of a 
crime are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. They 
are not like a personal or commercial debt owed to 
an individual or corporation, but are part of the 
judgment of conviction. Thus restitution is more 
like a fine or penalty, which would not be discharged 
in bankruptcy, than an obligation to the victim. If 
Congress had intended otherwise, said the court, 
"there would have been hearings, · testimony and 
debate concerning consequences so wasteful, so 
inimical to purposes previously deemed important 
and so likely to arouse public outrage." 
In addition to the justices' wise decision to keep 
federal bankruptcy courts out of the business of 
nullifying sentences imposed in state criminal 
courts, they saw benefits in encouraging the use of 
restitution as a condition of probation . or parole. 
Most states allow it, and a few even make it 
mandatory. It's good for the victim, of course, 
because he recovers some of his economic loss from 
the criminal. It's good for the state because it is so 
often used in place of costly imprisonment. And it's 
best for the offender, who not only avoids a prison 
term but is forced to confront, in concrete terms 
that cost him money, the impact of his criminal 
behavior. Paying $100 a month year after year to 
compensate someone he has harmed makes a 
strong and sustained impression on the offender. It 
is also a continuing reminder that crime has conse- 1 
quences. The Supreme Court's ruling should pro-
vide an incentive for criminal court judges to use 
the penalty more often. 
